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By John R. Snowden*
A Holistic Jurisprudential
View of the Drug Victim
[T] he fiction represents the pathology of the law. When all goes
well and established legal rules encompass neatly the social life
they are intended to regulate, there is little occasion for fictions.
There is also little occasion for philosophizing, for the law then pro-
ceeds with a transparent simplicity suggesting no need for reflec-
tive scrutiny. Only in illness, we are told, does the body reveal its
complexity. Only when legal reasoning falters and reaches out
clumsily for help do we realize what a complex undertaking the
law is.'
L INTRODUCTION
This article considers law, one manifestation of our efforts to
comprehend the consensual reality called life. A jurisprudential
perspective is offered in an attempt to construct a theory which
may explain the phenomenon of law. The perspective is also pre-
scriptive: it argues that law is not entirely rational, but is also
infused with other ways of knowing. Thus it may be that in a
larger sense the inquiry focuses on the mind.
Law is traditionally viewed as a condition for safety and
stability. Many people have argued that a particular type of sta-
bility, one that is dynamic, is required by the human mind. Freedom
and liberty are valued in most legal systems; psychology suggests,
however, that the mind may work against itself and history shows
that law may work against freedom. The American people and the
American legal system have struggled to prevent the bending of
law into an endorsement of totalitarian stability.
Freedom has persisted as a value in the face of witches, anarch-
ists, communists and pornographers. The free mind, protected by
law, has survived. But today a new spectre is haunting law which
poses perhaps the greatest danger yet to the free mind. Drugs,
licit and illicit, seem to threaten the mind in a new and frighten-
ingly direct manner.
This threat must be confronted directly. The law that creates
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Nebraska. A.B. 1966, J.D.
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and restrains government must not abdicate but rather accept its
responsibility to defend at all costs, even the apparent self-destruc-
tion of its constituents, the freedom of the mind. State controlled
and legally regulated thought is not the slippery slope, but the crest
of totalitarianism. 2
The use of dope8 symbolizes a recalcitrant experience of Ameri-
can life in the 1970s. The author doubts that individual choice in
the use of dope or drugs will seriously threaten freedom. The cur-
rent phenomenon of dope, however, seems to endanger the total
legal system supporting freedom.4 This article is a plea to the law-
makers-legislators, judges, lawyers, and citizens-to review closely
and then immediately change the legal response to the "drug prob-
lem." In short, "the use of the criminal process is wholly inappro-
priate."5
There are certain costs associated with the drug problem. One
author has noted: "Although one may reasonably conclude that the
issue of whether persons should have access to drugs other than
tobacco and alcohol is intrinsically not very interesting, it is likely
that our penal policy is exacting costs in this area that we cannot
prudently sustain." This article focuses on a particular cost of the
2. Staff, of Senate Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, Individual Rights and the Federal Role of
Behavior Modification, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., at 182-200 (Committee
Print 1974).
3. The selection of the symbol "dope" has some significance. Some
scholars suggest that indeed, "What's in a name?" may be a crucial
question. A rose may not smell as sweet if called a weed. See P.
HENLE, LANGUAGE, THOUGHT, mm Cu=E (1958). But see PsYcHo-
LINGuISTICS (S. SAPORTA ed. 1961). Indeed, it does not seem entire-
ly unreasonable that the scourge of society might be a positive boon,
or-at least a "legitimate" commercial success if originally introduced
through "normal" market avenues. See generally Bonnie & White-
bread, The Forbidden Fruit and the Tree of Knowledge: An Inquiry
into the Legal History of Marijuana Prohibition, 56 VA. L. REv. 971
(1970).
4. One always hesitates to widen the gap between law and the "bloom-
ing, buzzing confusion" sometimes recognized as reality. Nevertheless,
the focus here is primarily on the artificial system-construct, law. No
real effort is made hete to point out the human misery resulting from
the law's response to the dope experience. See generally J. KAPLAN,
MARIJANA: Tm NEW PnRoIBrriON (1970); N. Momus & G. HAwxIns,
TE HoNEsT PouricmsA's GUIDE TO CRnWm CONTROL (1970); IL PACKER,
THE Lnmrs oF TE Cm=NAL SAwcTIoN (1968); Skolnick, Coercion to
Virtue: The Enforcement of Morals, 41 S. CAL. L. REv. 588 (1968);
Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 372 ANNALs 157 (1967).
But see Junker, Criminalization and Crminogenesis, 19 U.C.L.A.L.
REV. 697 (1972). Better yet, pick up your local newspaper.
5. Monms & HAwmIs, supra note 4, at 8. See R. QunmEY, THE SocIAL
-REA L oF CpI=s (1970).
6. Allen, The Crimes of Politics: Political Dimensions of Criminal Jus-
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legal system's penal policy with regard to the dope experience
This is resulting in a severe warping of the legal system, and since
every element of that coherent system affects other elements, this
warping will uproot principles even at the core of American law.
The effects of this cost are pervasive:
No single law enforcement problem has occupied more time, effort
and money in the past four years than that of drug abuse and drug
addiction. We have regarded drugs as "public enemy number one,"
destroying the most precious resource we have-our young peo-
ple-and breeding lawlessness, violence and death.8
This societal response to drugs involves an election to engage in
civil war. "The concept is one that a liberal society cannot afford
to harbor."9 The war policy prevents anything from being unjust;
notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, have no place;
force and fraud become cardinal virtues.'0 Moreover, wars carry
with them a war psychology which
with only slight encouragement from circumstances or special
pleading, can be quickly converted into a war psychosis. A society
in such a mental state is not likely to achieve an accurate grasp
of reality, to establish sensible priorities, or to make correct cal-
culations of social costs involved in policy alternatives.' 1
Our legal system is significantly infected by this war psychosis.
The legal response through a penal or war policy should be changed
so that core principles of the legal system may be maintained. The
war policy has sent shock waves throughout the coherence of the
legal system. The "drug problem," like the "Jewish problem" of
past years, threatens a hideous remodeling of law.12
tice, Vol. 17, No. 3 University of Michigan Law Quadrangle Notes 19,
23 (1973). See Tribe, Policy Science, 2 PHmi. & PUB. AFFAmS 66 (1972).
The writer would note that far too many lawyers, judges, legislators,
and citizens are spending countless hours enmeshed in the legal webs
of the "drug problem" while society calls anxiously for their talents
to be exercised in grappling with the issues of reconstructing the land
of the free and the home of the brave.
7. See generally E. BRECHm, LicT AND IiLicrr DRUGS (Consumers Union
Report 1972); W. ELDRIDGE, NRCOTICs AND THE LAw, A CRITIQUE OF THE
AwmucAN EXPERMENT nm NARCOTIC DRUG CONTROL (2d ed. 1967); J.
INciDni & C. CHAMBERs, DRUGS AND THE CRimINAL JUSTICE SYSTEm
(1974); N. ZiNBERG & J. ROBERTSON, DRUGS AND Tm PUBLIC (1972).
8. Richard Nixon, from the White House, March 14, 1973 (cited in INCi-
ARDI & CHAmBERS, supra note 6, at 221). See also FEDERAL STRATEGY
FOR DRUG ABUSE AND DRUG TRAFFIC PREVENTION (1973).
9. Allen, supra note 6, at 24.
10. T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (1651).
11. Allen, supra note 6, at 24. See R. BLUM, SOCIETY AND DRUGS (1969);
T. DUSTER, THE LEGISLATION OF MORA=Y (1970); Lindesmith, Dope
Fiend Mythology, 31 J. CRIm. L.C. & P.S. '199 (1940).
12. See H. ALER, Tm JEws IN GE~m AN-Y (1969); N. COHN, WARRANT FOR
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.II. THE PERSPECTIVE
This article does not attempt a complete. statement of law in
either descriptive or prescriptive terms. It seems essential, how-
ever, that the jurisprudential perspective be examined. That
perspective might be named "Holistic Jurisprudence."''1 Holism re-
flects the view that law is "a special but not unique effort of the
human mind to make reality comprehendable and manageable
"14
The world's contents are given to each of us in order so foreign
to our subjective interest that we can hardly by an effort of the
imagination picture to ourselves what it is like. We have to break
that order altogether,--and by picking out from it the items which
concern us [sic], and connecting them with others far away,
which we say "belong" with them, we are able to make out definite
threads of sequence and tendency; to foresee particular liabilities
and get ready for them; and to enjoy simplicity and harmony in
place of what was chaos. Is not the sum of your actual experience
taken at this moment and impartially added together an utter
chaos? The strains of my voice, the lights and shades inside the
room and out, the murmur of the wind, the ticking of the clock,
the various organic feelings you may happen individually to pos-
sess, do these make a whole at all? Is it not the, only condition
of your mental sanity in the midst of them that most of them should
become non-existent for you, and that a few others-the sounds,,
I hope, which I am uttering-should evoke from places in your
memory that have nothing to do vith this scene associatei fitted
to combine with them in what we call a rational train of thought,--
rational because it leads to a conclusion which We have some organ
to appreciate? We have no organ or faculty to appreciate the
simply given order .... 15
GENOCIDE (1967); R. HIBEE, Tnn DssTrnucToN or Tim EURoPEAN JEws
(1961); Cording, Endlisung the Jurisprudent's Role in Questions of
National Policy( unpublish~d paper-prepared for the Jurisprudence
Seminar 1973, available at the University of Nebraska College of
Law). See generaly..J. GRAY, TaEnNATun.AND .SRoUMcS OF TaE LAw
96 (2d ed. 1921).. .
13. The roots of the perspective expounded here are the epistemology of
Brand Blanshard and William Van Orman Quine, and the jurispru-
dence of Jerome Hall. -See B.- BLANsnAI; Tan NATbR or ThouGnT
(1939); W.V.O. Qumn, FROM A LoGIcAL PoiNT or Vnw (1961); J. HALL,
FouNDATIoNs or JuRIsPRUDENcE (1973) [hereinafter cited as HALL].
14. W. BIsHEn & C. SroNn, -LAw, LANGUAGE, AND ETmcs vii (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Bis~nm & STONE]. I must give special thanks to
Professors Bishin and Stone of the U.S.C. Law Center for their mag-
nificent work, LAw, LAN4GE, AND- ETHIcs. Another significant and
creative work strangely enough entitled LAw, LANGUAGE AND COMMV-
NiCATiOit by Professor Walter Probert marks 1972 as a bumper year
for fresh insightful jurisprudential thought.
15. James, The Will to Believe and Other Essays 118 (1956), in BmsHn
& STONE 150. See also A. HuxLEY, DooRs Or PERcEPON 22-23 (1954).
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As the human grows, the mind needs to appreciate and know
segments of the world's contents. These known segments are gen-
erally called "reality." Breast, love, self, and law become real as
the human energy discriminatingly knows. The epistemological
crisis asks how. Unfortunately, the answer here can only be sug-
gestive. ' 6
It is suggested that the mind "knows" in a functionally distin-
guishable, yet resultantly unifying, holistic manner. For the sake
of presentation, several modes of "knowing" may be labeled expe-
rience, emotion or intuition, faith, and reason. These modes of
knowing work as a unit; that is, each mode plays a vital role in
the result, "I know." Nevertheless, various worldly contents seem
to be optimally known through different and distinct primary
modes. The primary mode of knowing the breast may be expe-
rience; knowing love may be emotion; self and God are matters of
faith; and reason is the craft of law. It does not seem essential
that the reader accept as true all of the primary mode reality re-
lationships offered. A holistic jurisprudential perspective, how-
ever, advances the hypothesis that law is a reality of the mind
learned through the primary mode of reason and multiple second-
ary modes, all working to the human result, "I know the law."
The holistic perspective rejects at the outset the hypothesis that
rules are the basic fabric of law.17 The problem is not to fit one
type of linear proposition, principles, within a model of other struc-
tural statements, rules.' 8 Holism asserts that law is part of life,
the only dance there is. The dance is seemingly dynamic and for-
ever changing-an observation that caused even Kelsen to be con-
cerned about developing a dynamic theory of law.' 9 Jerome Hall,
however, has illuminated the illusory dynamism of Kelsen's theory
noting that it is founded solely on the internal consistency of legal
rules with higher norms.2 0
16. Suzanne K. Langer seems most likely to have created an acceptable
answer via linear discourse. See S. LANGER, PHILOSOPHY IN A NEW KEY
88-101 (3d ed. 1957).
17. See Dworkin, Social Rules and Legal Theory, 81 YALE L.J. 855 (1972).
Dworkin rejects at least a great deal of the positive model of law de-
veloped by H.L.A. Hart. H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961). Legal
positivists are not, of course, interchangeable. See generally A. Ross,
ON LAw mm JusTcE (1959); THE WORKS OF JER~my BENTHAm (J.
Bowring ed. 1838, reprinted 1962). J. AusTiN, LEcTJURES ON JuRsPRu-
DENCE (4th ed. 1879); H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE
(1945).
18. See generally Sales, Fitting Principles Within a Positivistic Model of
Law, 53 NEB. L. REv. 58 (1974).
19. H. KsEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW ANm STATE 122 (1945).
20. HALL, supra note 13, at 164.
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Hall seems to share the holistic perspective through his concep-
tions of integrative jurisprudence and law-as-action. "[L]egal
directives are viewed not only as propositions having a certain
structure, but also as speech-acts.1 21 This realization that the pri-
mary mode of reason is in an action context is a recognition of mul-
tiple secondary modes of knowing. The sovereign's command issued
to a stranger may be primarily known through reason. But, in a sit-
uation involving strangers, other ways of knowing are present. Body
language is currently of some interest, and has long been employed
by those professional "behavior-liars," performing artists and politi-
cians. 22 The legal rule expressed in discursive form begins with
the instant of physiological constitution. Whether that is a capitula-
tion to unreason, to mysticism and irrationalism, or alternatively,
an argument for the rationality of presentational symbolism, 23 will
not be pursued in this article. What will be argued is that reason,
within a context defined through multiple and random secondary
modes of knowing, provides the primary means of understanding
a legal proposition.24
It is important that the reader understand why reason is as-
serted as the primary mode of knowing and testing the truth of
legal propositions. Law is an enterprise among strangers. While
other mo-des of knowing may suffice, the population explosion has
led us to accept reason as the easiest and most predictable method
of operation. We seem to have consented to the proposition that
shared experiences or percept overlays cannot be trusted. Time,
which seems to prevent all things from happening at once, tells
us that love is a severely restricted communicative device. Finally,
reason's distortion of faith to dogma and persecution counsels
against yielding our worldly affairs to unarticulated response. We
do not sleep, pray, or climb mountains with the lawmakers. Reason
is the lawyer's craft, and with it the lawyer hopes to construct for a
second the context of the client's plea.25
The holistic jurisprudential perspective views law as a system
of coherence. It wishes to build on the insights of Jerome Hall:
Instead of the traditional model of "rules first, then action," what
came first was action; then, much later, perception of the generality
of customs and articulation of rules, and finally, theorizing about
them...
21. Id. See J. Cnmc, LAxGUAm Am THE DiscovERY or RmATy (1961).
22. See generally D. MoRsRS, THE NAKED APE 139 (1967).
23. See LANCER, supra note 15; N. BROwN, Lim AGA IST DEATH (1959).
24. See generally F. ALLPoRT, THEouEs or PERCEPTION AND THE CONCEPT
OF STRuTCRE (1955).
25. See generally HALL, supra note 13, at 20; K. LLEWELLYN, THE CommniWO
LAw TRADrTION 3-4 (1960).
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In integrative jurisprudence, legal directives are viewed not only
as propositions having a certain structure, but also as speech-acts.
In speech-acts movements are expressed in the utterance of sounds,
in gestures, and in the publication of written words. Speech-acts
are acts of communication. Certain persons, members of the gen-
eral public and various officials, converse with each other; their
communication is comprised of talk and other actions of contem-
poraries as they enact, interpret, apply and enforce rules of law
which, though originally speech-acts, became inert as print until
they were again expressed in action. Inter-communication is not
restricted to an exchange of information; it may be an act of mutual
commitment, as in contract, a valuation as in legislation, an expres-
sion of emotion as, to some degree, in criminal law or, usually, a
combination of these. Speech-acts are intelligible as parts of a lan-
guage and in social contexts, and the study of those acts as well
as of the many nonverbal movements included in law-as-action can
explore many of their dynamic features.2 6
Karl Llewellyn: "Part of law, in many aspects, is all of society,
and all of man in society,"27 and Felix Frankfurter: "These judges
must have something of the creative artist in them, they must have
antennae registering feelings and judgment beyond logical, let alone
quantitative proof. '28
In coherence theory, knowing involves a complex assessment of
an entire system of consensual realities. Holism recognizes another
element-that the world contents are known randomly and in dis-
tinguishable primary and secondary modes.
From the moment of conception, the mind utilizes modes of
knowing to construct a field of beliefs. Each new experience is
checked against the totality of beliefs in the field at the time of
validation, and a field of beliefs bounded by the world's contents
develops. Each new world content to be known, tested as true,
must cohere with the holistic field. No action is true because of
an independent correspondence with "reality;" instead each new ac-
tion is tested against a holistic field of mutually supportive beliefs.
Even the most basic and seemingly logical relations or beliefs,
such as the rising of the sun in the east, are "true" only with respect
to their utility in holding together the field. "Core" beliefs, and
26. HALL, supra note 13, at 162, 164-65.
27. K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE 40-41 (1962).
28. Address by Mr. Justice Frankfurter to the American Philosophical So-
ciety in 1954, cited in A. BIctxL, THE LEAST DANG ous TBNCH,EE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF PoLrxcs 239 (1962). See also Curtis,
A Better Theory of Legal Interpretation, 3 VAND. L. REv. 407, 422-23(1950); Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor
Hart, 71 HAhv. L. REV. 630, 670 (1958); H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal
Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law
(1958) (mimeograph).
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indeed the whole field, may be shattered by some possible (though
perhaps unimaginable) new action. Any action may be determined
to be "true," if drastic enough adjustments (changes or reformula-
tions of beliefs, "realities") are made throughout the field.29
Actors within the legal system who wish at any moment to
"know the law" hypothesize an action and test the truth of that
hypothesis by questioning whether it coheres with the existing body
of beliefs. The entire field is in constant flux, but the dynamic
effect is felt less as it moves toward the core of the field.
For example,20 suppose one wishes to "know the law" with
respect to the due process requirements of a welfare hearing. If
we assume a case of first impression, we begin at the periphery
of the field. The first checkpoint within the field may be an accept-
ed belief regarding a selective service hearing. Progessing inward
through the field one may find at the second check point, CP2,
"I believe X2 about a criminal trial;" then CP3, "I believe X3
and 4 about due process of law;" CP 4, "I believe X5, ( and 7 about
liberty;" CP5 "I believe Xs, 9, lo and 11 about justice;" CP, "I be-
lieve X 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 about the notion of good." Thus the prop-
osition of law, often issued in directive or dispute-resolving form,
is accepted as true if it coheres with the entire field of beliefs.
The theory posits something like "good" as an all inclusive and
core reality in the field. As one progresses from the core toward
the periphery of immediate experience, inclusivity and vagueness
give way. The "good" becomes the more precise concept of justice;
justice is narrowed to liberty, and liberty is reduced to due process
of law.
It must be stressed that the validation is not isolated in a linear
legal dimension.31 For instance, one checkpoint may involve a be-
lief about Goya's sketches. Additionally, and importantly, the co-
herence is holistic with regard to other modes of knowing. There
may be checkpoints involving matters known through faith as the
primary mode-do justice, love mercy, and walk humbly with thy
lord. There may be checkpoints in the primary mode of experience
or emotion/intuition-"What do you think you're doing back there!"
Several figures may best illustrate the above discussion:
29. See BIsmN & SToN, supra note 14.
30. Refer to figures 1-5, p. 358-59 infra.
31. "A person's set of actions, his style of life, may exhibit many contra-
dictions., In addition, since action exists in the world, it is subject to
physical and biological laws, that is, there are factors to be considered
in the coherence of actions that are irrelevant to the logic of sen-
tences." HALL at 177, n.62. See T. KuEN, TnE STRucTURE OF Scmr-
Tmc REVOLUTIONS (1968); C.I. Lxwis, VALuEs AmD ImPsTrAES (1969).
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Figure 1
The field is viewed at the beginning.
Faith
Intuition
Figure 2
The field is viewed at the beginning through
an enlarging device.
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Figure 3
The field is viewed through an enlarging
device at the moment of knowing the first
world content, reality. The reality becomes
part of the field.
3 E-I
Figure 4
The field is viewed through an enlarging de-
vice at the moment of knowing world content,
reality X. Coherence checks X, working to-
ward the core at levels 3, 2, 1 and in all modes.
X becomes a part of and shapes the field.
0
Figure 5
The field is viewed.
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On many occasions the validation required to "know the law"
is exceedingly simple with the actor noticing only a minor intrusion
into the field. In situations involving "difficult questions" the in-
trusion is extensive and pushes to the core of the field. The writer
would suggest that counsel's practical success is directly propor-
tional to the degree of compliance attained in directing the other
legal actors to the level selected in the field. But regardless of
cognition, the dynamic effect of the field validation is always
total.
3 2
The above discussion has attempted to sketch the more signifi-
cant dimensions of a holistic jurisprudential perspective. Now, the
cost hypothesis must be considered. The legal system has re-
sponded to the recalcitrant dope experience by producing actions
which, in order to cohere with our field of beliefs, require drastic
and rather ugly readjustments at the core of law.
32. See ALLPORT, supra note 24.
The logical relation between any single decision and 'the law'
is exactly the same as that between any single act of a man
and 'his character'. Just as 'his character' merely means a no-
tational pattern which shows the consistency of his behaviour,
so 'the law' merely means a notational pattern which shows
the consistency of the decisions. And just as our view of the
significance of any single act is determined by our view of
his character, so our view of the significance of any given de-
cision is determined by our view of the law....
It was said that the significance of the observed behavior
only emerges when this behaviour is seen both in the special
context in which it occurred and in the wider context of the
man's behaviour generally. It may therefore be assumed that
there is a certain point in time at which the data crystallize, as
it were, at which we can make a proposition about the signifi-
cance of a given act in the sure knowledge that we will not
have to qualify or modify it subsequently. This is not so.
Firstly, 'the man's behaviour generally' of course includes his
future behaviour, so while he is still alive it is logically im-
possible to make such a proposition-if it is borne in mind
that by 'his character' we mean a pattern which shows the
consistency of all his actions, and by the significance of an
act we mean what the act stands for within this pattern. As
long as we cannot take account of all the man's actions every
pattern which we construct must necessarily be a provisional
one, subject to modification as additional data become avail-
able. It follows that any placing of a given act within such
pattern must also be provisional. Secondly, even if the diffi-
culty presented by future behaviour is removed (as by remov-
ing the man from this world), the profusion and complexity
of the data to be processed, quite apart from the question of
their availability, is such that it is practically impossible to
attain certainty. We always remain in the sphere of hypoth-
eses.
A. HARAPI, NEGLIGENCE IN THE LAW OF ToRTs 13-18 (1962).
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III. THE CASES: THE INFECTION
In this section Nebraska Supreme Court opinions are used to
represent the judicial response to the "drug problem." Other juris-
dictions, state and federal, vary only in particulars and degree.
Some of the cases consider issues raised by statutes directed at the
dope experience. Others involve issues that merely arise in a dope
context. The author finds no ground for analytic distinctions in
the two situations. It will be argued that the presence of dope dis-
torts the coherence of the legal system. Instead of forming the
foundation of freedom, it becomes the servant of caprice, arbitrar-
iness, and eventually totalitarianism.
A. Proof of Illegal Possession
In State v. McElroy8" the Nebraska Supreme Court held that
in the absence of a legislative declaration to the contrary, a quantity
of drugs with a potential for abuse was not an essential element
for the offense of unlawful possession of a controlled substance.
No reason to support that decision can be found in the opinion.
A search of McElroy revealed a folded opaque newspaper measur-
ing only 11/2 by 2 inches that enclosed a minute quantity of cocaine
hydrochloride, container and contents together weighing only 5 mil-
ligrams.34 The facts seemed to indicate that possession was know-
ing and intentional.35 The substance was consumed in the chemical
tests for cocaine.
Judge McCown, dissenting, noted that the tests did not ascertain
the percentage of cocaine. The substance was not tested for purity,
nor was it determined to be inactive,3 6 and the majority seemed
-33. 189 Neb. 376, 202 N.W.2d 752 (1972). But see People v. Leal, 64 Cal.
2d 504, 413 P.2d 665, 50 Cal. Rptr. 777 (1966); Watson v. State, 88 Nev.
196, 495 P.2d 365 (1972); State v. Haddock, 101 Ariz. 240, 418 P.2d 577(1966). The general topic is annotated at Annot., 91 A.L.R.2d 810
(1963).
-34. Id. at 377, 202 N.W.2d at 754.
35. A person knowingly or intentionally possessing a controlled
substance, except marijuana, unless such substance was ob-
tained directly, or pursuant to a valid prescription or order
from a practitioner, while acting in the course of his profes-
sional practice, or except as otherwise authorized by sections
28-459 and 28-4,115 to 28-4,142, shall, upon conviction thereof,
be sentenced to a term of imprisonment not less than one year
nor more than two years in the Nebraska Penal and Correc-
tional Complex, or a fine of not more than five hundred dol-
lars, or to a term of imprisonment in the county jail of not
more than six months, or be both so fined and imprisoned.
NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-4,125(3) (Cum. Supp. 1974). See also State v.
Ambrose, 192 Neb. 285, 220 N.W.2d 18 (1974).
36. 189 Neb. at 379, 202 N.W.2d at 755.
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to assume that 5 milligrams of cocaine, even if 100 per cent pure,
was incapable of affecting an individual.37 Nevertheless, there was
a rather direct effect on McElroy.
If it is assumed that the current statutory scheme reflects a de-
sire to protect the citizen from himself, or to protect the state from
"undesirable" citizens,38 then McElroy may be at least half correct.
While it seems strange to protect a person by sending him to a
prison environment for possessing an item that at best has only
a chemical reality and no apparent use other than as a medium
of expression for state chemists, the decision to imprison McElroy
as an "undesirable" does exhibit minimal rationality. It is expected,
however, that Americans are still somewhat taken aback by the
coherence of that proposition. 9
What incentives are there for the unapprehended drug offender
to "go straight" after McElroy? Would he be likely to throw away
or destroy controlled substances knowing that any remaining speck
would yield the same result if somehow discovered. After McElroy,
could one rely on a finding of insufficient intent? To the trained
eyes of law enforcement officials there seems always to be a seed.40
There may be a coherence that yields a more complete under-
standing of McElroy. The writer has yet to grasp fully why law-
makers have singled out dope (illicit drugs) as an illegal form of
self-abuse. Chocolate malts, prunes, marriage, children, cars, and
private ownership of real and personal property, all highly conduc-
ive to abusive behavior, have somehow escaped prohibition. It
seems reasonable to surmise that dope's downfall has been its un-
usually high success ratio, i.e., in comparison with other forms of
self-abuse, the instances of the participants actually being "abused,"
feeling good without paying an institutionally acceptable price, are
more frequent.
If failure to pay the price is the basis for the prohibition, the
McElroy decision may make sense as a reaffirmation of the capri-
cious and total power of the sovereign. It is not a nonsensical idea
that price is not subject to reasoned elaboration or coherence.41
That you must pay a politically acceptable price, or your good time
37. Id. at 379, 202 N.W.2d at 755. The majority cites SoLLMAN, A MANUAL
oF PmuuvRAcOLOGY (8th ed. 1957).
38. See ADLER, supra note 12, at 67-82.
39. See Allen, supra note 6.
40. But cf. R. ALPERT, SEED (1972).
41. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication (an unpublished paper
presented by Professor Fuller to a group of Harvard University faculty
on November 19, 1957). Excerpts from the paper may be found in
Hart & Sacks, supra note 28, at 421.
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becomes criminal self-abuse, is at least bothersome. Nevertheless,
this appears to be the policy adopted as the most "liberal" semi-
official institutional response.42
B. Probable Cause
The McElroy opinion also infected concepts of privacy and
search and seizure. On appeal McElroy additionally argued that
no probable cause existed for his warrantless arrest. The court be-
gan, "Wherever an individual may harbor a reasonable expectation
of privacy he ought to be free from unreasonable governmental
intrusion."43 The court concluded that probable cause existed be-
cause the officer involved had, by looking through binoculars, ob-
served McElroy light a pipe while sitting in his van at a drive-
in. To the trained and binoculared eyes of the officer the flame
from the pipe indicated dope.
By finding probable cause in this situation, the court demonstra-
ted that any statement can be held true if drastic enough changes
are made in the system to which the statement must cohere. The
decision offers no suggestion of the reasons why the officer trained
his binoculars on the McElroy vehicle. Was the officer engaging
in binoculared observation of everything in his path; or just homes,
just drive-ins, just cars at drive-ins, just vans at drive-ins? It is
not surprising that a year later the court said: "Individual rights
on occasion must give way to the rights of society. This is the very
purpose of law-to restrict the rights of the individual to provide
protection for society."44
C. Speedy Trial
In State v. Alvarez45 the court was asked to examine the right
to a speedy trial in a case where the defendant was charged with
42. See FIRST REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ComrmiISsION OF MARIrUANA AND
DRUG ABUSE, MARIHUANA: A SIGNAL OF MISUNDERSTANDING 127-79
(1972). The Commission's "discouragement policy" is markedly out
of line with a society which adheres to the notion that the individual
is the best judge of what is in his best interests. See also SECOND
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON MIaRUANA AND DRUG ABUSE,
DRUG USE IN AMERICA: PROBLEM IN PERSPECTIVE (1973) [hereinafter
cited as DRUG Co1vIIssIoN H-].
43. 189 Neb. at 378, 202 N.W.2d at 754.
44. State v. Romonto, 190 Neb. 825, 830, 212 N.W.2d 641, 644-45 (1973).
Please, read that quote again! Individual rights may on occasion give
way to the interests of society. But, can the "very purpose" of law
offered grow in soil that is not prepared for such a hideous flower.
Imagine the composition of that soil.
45. 189 Neb. 281, 202 N.W.2d 604 (1972).
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the unlawful sale of hashish. Nebraska statutes,46 apparently con-
trolling, required trial within a six month period from the date of
indictment or information. The time may be extended for any of
the specific reasons set forth in the statutory scheme or for reasons
not specifically enumerated, but only if those reasons constitute
"good cause."
The court held that failure to demand a speedy trial may be
considered in determining whether there was "good cause" for de-
lay, and found that the record established "good cause" because of
the court's docket congestion. The court thereby affirmed the trial
court's general finding of "good cause" by balancing considerations
46. 29-1205. .- ight of accused; speedy trial. To effectuate the right
of the accused to a speedy trial and the interest of the public
in prompt disposition of criminal cases, insofar as is practica-
ble:(1) The trial of criminal cases shall be given preference
over civil cases; and(2) The trial of defendants in custody and defendants
whose pretrial liberty is reasonably believed to present un-
usual risks shall be given preference over other criminal cases.
It shall be the duty of the county attorney to bring to the
attention of the trial court any cases falling within this sub-
division, and he shall generally advise the court of facts rele-
vant in determining the order of cases to be tried.
29-1206. Continuance; how granted. Applications for contin-
uances shall be made in accordance with section 25-1148, but
in criminal cases in the district court the court shall grant a
continuance only upon a showing of good cause and only for
so long as is necessary, taking into account not only the re-
quest or consent of the prosecution or defense, but also the
public interest in prompt disposition of the case.
29-1207. Trial within six months; time; how computed. (1)
Every person indicted or informed against for any offense
shall be brought to trial within six months, and such time
shall be computed as provided in this section.(2) Such six-month period shall commence to run from
the date the indictment is returned or the information filed.
As to indictments or informations or orders for a new trial
pending on April 30, 1971, such six-month period shall com-
mence to run from April 30, 1971.(3) If such defendant is to be tried again following a
mistrial, an order for a new trial, or an appeal or collateral
attack, such period shall commence to run from the date of
the mistrial, order granting a new trial, or the mandate on
remand.(4) The following periods shall be excluded in computing
the time for trial:(a) The period of delay resulting from other proceedings
concerning the defendant, including but not limited to an ex-
amination and hearing on competency and the period during
which he is incompetent to stand trial; the time from filing
until final disposition of pretrial motions of the defendant, in-
cluding motions to suppress evidence, motions to quash the
indictment or information, demurrers and pleas in abatement
and motions for a change of venue- and the time consumed
in the trial of other charges against the defendant;
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of whether an affirmative request was made by the defendant, the
extent and nature of the delay, and whether the defendant had
been prejudiced by the delay. In sum, the holding was that "good
cause" will, "necessarily depend upon the facts in each case. '4 7
Consequently, as in McElroy,48 Alvarez resulted in serious warping
of the system's coherence.
Three judges dissented in Alvarez. Judge McCown argued that
a defendant's failure to demand a speedy trial could not be con-
sidered in determining "good cause" for delay. His argument,
joined in by Judge Smith, was couched in constitutional terms:
It can scarcely be doubted that the basic burden of bringing cases
to trial is on the prosecution and that the responsibility is also on
(b) The period of delay resulting from a continuance
granted at the request or with the consent of the defendant
or his counsel. A defendant without counsel shall not be
deemed to have consented to a continuance unless he has been
advised by the court of his right to a speedy trial and the ef-
fect of his consent;
(c) The period of delay resulting from a continuance
granted at the request of the prosecuting attorney, if:
(i) The continuance is granted because of the unavailabil-
ity of evidence material to the state's case, when the prose-
cuting attorney has exercised due diligence to obtain such evi-
dence and there are reasonable grounds to believe that such
evidence will be available at the later date; or
(ii) The continuance is granted to allow the prosecuting
attorney additional time to prepare the state's case and addi-
tional time is justified because of the exceptional circum-
stances of the case;
(d) The period of delay resulting from the absence or un-
availability of the defendant;
(e) A reasonable period of delay when the defendant isjoined for trial with a codefendant as to whom the time for
trial has not run and there is good cause for not granting a
severance. In all other cases the defendant shall be granted
a severance so that he may be tried within the time limits
applicable to him; and
(f) Other periods of delay not specifically enumerated
herein, but only if the court finds that they are for good cause.
29-1208. Discharge from offense charged; when. If a defend-
ant is not brought to trial before the running of the time for
trial, as extended by excluded periods, he shall be entitled to
his absolute discharge from the offense charged and for any
other offense required by law to be joined with that offense.
29-1209. Failure of defendant to move for discharge prior to
trial efitry of plea; effect. -Failure of defendant to move
for discharge prior to trial or entry of a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere shall constitute a waiver of the right to speedy
trial.
NEE. R v. STAT. §§ 29-1205-09 (Cum Supp. 1974).
47. 189 Neb. at 287, 202 N.W.2d at 608.
48. The McElroy court noted that "[tjhe constitutional validity of a war-
rantless search can only be decided in the concrete factual context of
the individual case." Id. at 378, 202 N.W.2d at 754.
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the State to show a waiver of the right to a speedy trial. To hold
that affirmative action by an accused is necessary to protect a con-
stitutional right rather than to waive it emasculates the right just
as effectively as to hold that silence or inaction imply a waiver.
Both misallocate the burden of proof as well as the burden of insur-
ing a speedy trial.49
Judge Boslaugh, writing a separate dissent focused on another
problem apparent in Alvarez. "[T] he operation of the statute is
similar to a statute of limitations. Unlike the constitutional right
[to speedy trial], there may be no balancing of considerations in-
volved. If there are no periods of time to be excluded, the opera-
tion of the statute is automatic." 50
State v. Brown, State v. Mai, State v. Skinner, and State v.
Smith5 1 were decided the same day as Alvarez. Each involved the
same trial court as Alvarez, the same statutory right to speedy trial
or absolute discharge, and the sale or possession of illicit drugs. Of
course, the court affirmed, in each case, the trial court's finding
that "good cause" for delay had existed. It should be noted that
in each of these cases the trial judge had blatantly ignored the di-
rective of the legislature by setting the trial date well beyond the
six month limitation in the first instance.
D. Sentencing
In State v. Greco,52 the defendant pleaded guilty to the illegal
possession of amphetamines. Defendant's act was transformed into
a crime because he had not obtained the substance from one of
the sovereign's licensed drug dispensers-doctor or pharmacist.
The defendant in Greco had no prior criminal record other than
one traffic offense. The state made no recommendation, but agreed
not to resist an application for probation. The trial court accepted
the plea and imposed a sentence of 1 to 2 years in the State Re-
formatory for Women. On appeal the supreme court found that
the trial court had not abused its discretion by denying probation.
Judge McCown in a dissenting opinion offered the only statement
which could cohere with the propositions previously explicitly ac-
cepted and adopted by the legal system. "Under the A.B.A. Senten-
49. Id. at 293, 202 N.W.2d at 611.
50. Id. at 296, 202 N.W.2d at 612. See Dworkin, The Model 'of Rules, 35
U. Car. L. REv. 14 (1967), for a discussion of the notion that constitu-
tional principles may be balanced, while statutory rules require "auto-
matic" application.
51. These companion cases are all found at 189 Neb. 297, 202 N.W.2d 585
(1972).
52. 189 Neb. 817, 205 N.W.2d 550 (1973).
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cing Standards adopted by this court, probation should have been
granted here.153
E. Forfeiture of Vehicles
In State v. One 1970 2-Door Sedan Rambler54 the court con-
sidered a forfeiture provision relating to the commission of a dope
offense.55 The basic statutory scheme provides for the seizure and
53. Id. at 819, 205 N.W.2d at 552. The A.B.A. Standards Relating to Sen-
tencing Alternatives and Procedures were adopted by the Nebraska
Supreme Court in State v. Shonkwiler, 187 Neb. 747, 194 N.W.2d 172
(1972). See Annot., 55 A.L.R.3d 812 (1974); A.B.A. PRoJECT ON
STANDAws FOR C1nvrrTAL JusTIcE, STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING
ALTERNATivEs ms PROcEDuREs (Approved Draft, 1971).
2.2 General principle: judicial discretion. The sentence im-
posed in each case should call for the minimum amount of
custody or confinement which is consistent with the protection
of the public, the gravity of the offense and the rehabilitative
needs of the defendant. 2.3 Sentences not involving confine-
ment. ... 2.3 (c) A sentence not involving confinement is
to be preferred to a sentence involving partial or total confine-
ment in the absence of affirmative reasons to the contrary.
Id. at 61, 64. But see State v. Shimp, 190 Neb. 137, 206 N.W.2d 627
(1973).
54. 191 Neb. 462, 215 N.W.2d 849 (1974).
55. Seized without Warrant, Subject to Forfeitures; Disposal; Manner;
When; Accepted as Evidence. (1) The following shall be
seized without warrant by an officer of the Division of Drug
Control or by any peace officer, and the same shall be subject
to forfeiture: (a) All controlled substances which have been
manufactured, distributed, dispensed, acquired or possessed in
violation of the provisions of sections 28-459 and 28-4,115 to
28-4,142; (b) all raw materials, products and equipment of
any kind which are used, or intended for use, in manufactur-
ing, compounding, processing, administering, delivering, im-
porting or exporting any controlled substance in violation of
the provisions of sections 28-459 and 28-4,115 to 28-4,142; (c)
all property which is used, or is intended for use, as a con-
tainer for property described in subdivisions (a) and (b) of
this subsection; (d) all conveyances including aircraft, vehi-
cles, or vessels which are used, or intended for use, to trans-
port any property described in subdivisions (a) and (b) of
this subsection; Provided, any conveyance seized including
aircraft, vehicles or vessels shall be released by the proper
court upon a showing by the owner of record of such convey-
ance that the owner had no knowledge that such conveyance
was being used in violation of any provision of sections 28-
459 and 28-4,115 to 28-4,142; and (e) books, records and re-
search, including formulas, microfilm, tapes, and data which
are used, or intended for use in violation of the provisions of
sections 28-459 and 28-4,115 to 28-4,142.(2) Any conveyance, including aircraft, vehicles, or ves-
sels, which is used, or intended for use to transport any prop-
erty described in subdivisions (a) and (b) of subsection (1)
of this section is hereby declared to be a common nuisance,
and any peace officer having probable cause to believe that
such conveyance is so used or intended for such use shall
make a search thereof with or without a warrant.
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forfeiture of all conveyances used to transport any illicit drug. At
the outset it should be noted that forfeiture of an article that is
(3) All property seized without a search warrant shall not
be subject to a replevin action and: (a) Shall be kept by the
officer seizing such property for so long as it is needed as evi-
dence in any trial, and (b) when no longer required as evi-
dence, all property described in subdivision (1) (e) of this sec-
tion shall be disposed of on order of a court of record of this
state in such manner as the court in its sound discretion shall
direct, and all property described in subdivisions (a), (b),
and (c) of subsection (1) of this section, that has been used
or is intended to be used in violation of the provisions of sec-
tions 28-459 and 28-4,115 to 28-4,142, when no longer needed
as evidence shall be destroyed by the law enforcement agency
holding the same or the Bureau of Examining Boards or
turned over to the custody of the department; Provided, that
a law enforcement agency may keep a small quantity of the
property described in subdivisions (a), (b), and (c )of sub-
section (1) of this section for training purposes or use in
investigations; and provided further, that any large quantity
of property described in subdivisions (a), (b), and (c) of sub-
section (1) of this section, whether seized under a search war-
rant or validly seized without a warrant, may be disposed of
on order of a court of record of this state in such manner as
the court in its sound discretion shall direct. Such an order
may be given only after a proper laboratory examination and
report of such property has been completed and after a hear-
ing has been held by the court after notice to the defendant
of the proposed disposition of the property. The findings in
such court order as to the nature, kind, and quantity of the
property so disposed of may be accepted as evidence at subse-
quent court proceedings in lieu of the property ordered de-
stroyed by the court order.(4) When any conveyance, including aircraft, vehicles, or
vessels, is seized under subdivision (1) (d) of this section, the
person seizing the same shall within five days thereafter cause
to be filed in the district court of the county in which seizure
was made a complaint for condemnation of the conveyance
seized. The proceedings shall be brought in the name of the
state by the county attorney of the county in which the con-
veyance was seized. The complaint shall describe the convey-
ance, state the name of the owner if known, allege the essen-
tial elements of the violation which is claimed to exist, and
shall conclude with a prayer of due process to enforce the for-
feiture. Upon the filing of such a complaint, the court shall
promptly cause process to issue to the sheriff, commanding
him to take possession of the conveyance described in the
complaint and to hold the same for further order of the court.
The sheriff shall at the time of taking possession serve a copy
of the process upon the owner of the conveyance in person
or by registered or certified mail at his last-known address;
Provided, any conveyance seized including aircraft, vehicles
or vessels shall be released by the proper court upon a show-
ing by the owner of record of such conveyance that such
owner had no knowledge that such conveyance was being
used in violation of any provision of sections 28-459 and 28-
4,115 to 28-4,142. At the expiration of twenty days after such
seizure by the sheriff if no claimant has appeared to defend
such complaint, the court shall order the sheriff to dispose of
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not itself contraband is unusual.56 The proximity of illicit drugs
again results in special treatment. A vehicle may be used in rob-
bing, raping, and murdering without forfeiture, but here the court
required the forfeiture of a vehicle in which two ounces of mari-
juana was found.57
the seized conveyance.
Any person having an interest in the conveyance proceeded
against, or any person against whom a civil or criminal liabil-
ity would exist if such conveyance is in violation of the provi-
sions of sections 28-459 and 28-4,115 to 28-4,142 may, within
twenty days following the sheriff's taking of possession, ap-
pear and file answer or demurrer to the complaint. The an-
swer or demurrer shall allege the interest or liability of the
party filing it. In all other respects the issue shall be made
up as in other civil actions.
When any conveyance is ordered sold by the court, the
proceeds from the sale less the legal costs and charges shall
be paid to the county treasurer for disposition in the manner
provided for disposition of license money under the Constitu-
tion of this state. Whenever the condemnation of the convey-
ance is decreed, the court shall allow the claim of any claim-
ant to the extent of such claimant's interest, for remission or
mitigation of such forfeiture if such claimant proves to the
satisfaction of the court (1) that he has not committed or
caused to be committed an- offense in violation of the provi-
sions of sections 28-459 and 28-4,115 to 28-4,142 and has no
interest in any controlled substance referred to in sections 28-
459 and 28-4,115 to 28-4,142; (2) that he has an interest in such
conveyance as owner or ienor or otherwise, acquired by him
in good faith; and (3) that he at no time had any knowledge
or reason to believe that such conveyance was being or would
be used in, or to facilitate, the violation of the provisions of
sections 28-459 and 28-4,115 to 28-4,142.
When a decree of condemnation is entered against any con-
veyance, court costs and fees and storage and other proper ex-
penses shall be charged against the person, if any, intervening
as claimant of the conveyance. When a conveyance is sold
under court order, the officer holding the sale shall make a
return to the court showing to whom the conveyance was sold
and for what price. This return together with the court order
shall authorize the county clerk to issue a title to the pur-
chaser of the conveyance if such conveyance requires such
title under the laws of this state.
NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-4135 (Supp. 1974).
56. See generally NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-1131 (Supp. 1974) (forfeiture of ille-
gally used "police radio"); NEB. REv. STAT. § 54-726.04 (1968) (infected
swine); NEs. REv. STAT. § 66-433 (1971) (vehicles used to illegally
transport motor vehicle fuels). NEB. REv. SAT. § 29-820 (1964) gener-
ally provides for the return of seized property on order of the court.
57. 191 Neb. at 467, 215 N.W.2d at 852. The legislature also provides spe-
cial educational programs for drug offenders that are somehow not
needed for robbers, rapers, and murders. NEB. RwT. STAT. § 28-4.125 (6)
(Supp. 1974) provides:
If a person is convicted of a violation under this section,
as a part of the sentence he shall be required during the period
of confinement to attend a course of instruction conducted by
the department on the effects, medically, psychologically and
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Reasoning in the usual fashion for dope cases, the court stated
that due process depends on the setting, and concluded that "the
present situation is one where a valid governmental interest justi-
fies the seizure upon the discovery of contraband."58 The majority
argued that the statutory requirement that a forfeiture complaint
be filed within five days after seizure combined with notice and
hearing met the tests of due process. 59 The deprivation of property
prior to hearing was justified on the grounds that unless the vehicle
was seized, it could be removed from the court's jurisdiction or used
in further criminal activities.6"
Judge McCown dissented arguing no important governmental
interest justified seizure before notice and hearing. Moreover, if
notice and hearing are to serve any purpose, they must be granted
at a time when deprivation of property may still be prevented.
Judge McCown also touched, but did not expand upon, the problems
created by section 28-4,136 of the Nebraska statutes.'61 That statute
socially, of the misuse of controlled substances. He shall also
be required to receive medical treatment, while so confined,
for the effect upon him of controlled substances. If a person
is placed on probation, as a condition of probation he shall
attend and complete an identical course of instruction con-
ducted by the department and pay a fee of five dollars for
the course. As a further condition the person shall be re-
quired to receive medical treatment for the effects of con-
trolled substances abuses.
See also NEB. Rav. STAT. § 28-4,138 (Supp. 1974). The section provides
a general "educational" program to prevent and deter misuse and
abuse of controlled substances.
58. Id. at 464, 215 N.W.2d at 851. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht
Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974), reversing, 363 F. Supp. (D.P.R.
1973). But see City of Everett v. Slade, 83 Wash. 2d 80, 515 P.2d
1295 (1973). Slade attempted to follow Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67 (1972), and held a Washington forfeiture statute unconstitutional on
due process grounds. The United States Supreme Court refused to
hold a similar statute in Calero-Toledo to be unconstitutional. Since
Slade and Calero-Toledo another state court has stepped forward to
reject the legitimacy of forfeiture. See State v. One Porsche, 526 P.2d
917 (1974).
59. Id. at 465, 215 N.W.2d at 851.
60. Id. See 416 U.S. 663.
61. Complaint; burden of proof; liability. (1) It shall not be neces-
sary for the state to negate any exemption or exception set
forth in sections 28-459 and 28-4,115 to 28-4,142 in any com-
plaint, information, indictment or other pleading or in any
trial, hearing, or other proceeding under the provisions of
sections 28-459 and 28-4,115 to 28-4,142 and the burden of
proof of any such exemption or exception shall be upon the
person claiming its benefit.
(2) In the absence of proof that a person is the duly au-
thorized holder of an appropriate registration or order form
issued under the provisions of sections 28-459 and 28-4,115 to
28-4,142, he shall be presumed not to be the holder of such
registration or form, and the burden of proof shall be upon
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provides that the owner of the vehicle has the burden of proof in
establishing the forfeiture exception and that he had no knowledge
that the conveyance was being used in violation of the law.
The ease with which the majority disposed of the constitutional
due process aspects of the case may explain their drastic construc-
tion of the statutory language "to transport." "Transport" was con-
strued to include the situation where, as here, the vehicle was trans-
porting a human who had possession of illicit drugs. Judge Clinton
in a separate dissenting opinion reasoned that because the Nebraska
statute omitted the language, "or in any manner to facilitate the
transportation .... -62 as found in the federal statute63 which he
him to rebut such presumption.(3) No liability shall be 'imposed by virtue of the provi-
sions of sections 28-459 and 28-4,115 to 28-4,142 upon any duly
authorized state officer, engaged in the enforcement of the
provisions of sections 28-459 and 28-4,115 to 28-4,142, who
shall be engaged in the enforcement of any law or municipal
ordinance relating to controlled substances.
NEE. R~v. STAT. § 28-4136 (Supp. 1974).
62. Forfeitures.(a) Property subject. The following shall be subject to
forfeiture to the United States and no property right shall ex-
ist in them:(1) All controlled substances which have been manufac-
tured, distributed, dispensed, or acquired in violation of this
subchapter.(2) All raw materials, products, and equipment of any
kind which are used, or intended for use, in manufacturing,
compounding, processing, delivering, importing, or exporting
any controlled substance in violation of this subchapter.(3) All property which is used, or intended for use, as a
container for property described in paragraph (1) or (2).(4) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or ves-
sels, which are used, or are intended for use, to transport, or
in any manner to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt,possession, or concealment of property described in paragraph(1) or (2), except that-(A) no conveyance used by any person as a common car-
rier in the transaction of business as a common carrier shall
be forfeited under the provisions of this section unless it shall
appear that the owner or other person in charge of such con-
veyance was a consenting party or privy to a violation of this
subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter; and(B) no conveyance shall be forfeited under the provisions
of this section by reason of any act or omission established
by the owner thereof to have been committed or omitted by
any person other than such owner while such conveyance was
unlawfully in the possession of a person other than the owner
in violation of the criminal laws of the United States, or of
any State.(5) All books, records, and research including formulas,
microfilm, tapes, and data which are used, or intended for use,
in violation of this subchapter.
21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (1970).
63. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (4) (1970).
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thought spawned the Nebraska act, it could only mean that the
Nebraska legislature did not intend to equate human possession in
a vehicle with the phrase "to transport."64 Judge Clinton argued:
If, for example, the Legislature intended to include only those cases
where the purpose of the substance being in the car was to move
the substance from one point to another then a limited definition
of transport is required. A homely illustration might make the
point. If one takes several bags of groceries from the supermarket
to one's home it can be readily stated that he is using the automo-
bile "to transport" the groceries. On the other hand, if one keeps
a box of kleenex in the glove compartment for use when needed,
can it really be argued that the automobile is being used "to trans-
port" the kleenex.
In short, I would accept the defendant's argument that the forfeit-
ure provisions of the statute were aimed at trafficking in controlled
substances. In this case the quantity of marijuana found in the car
was very small. Certain other evidence, residue of smoked mari-
juana, the packaging method indicate the substance was in the car
for use. There was no evidence that the owner was dealing in
drugj.65
Statutes should be construed in their entirety. The question
presented by the Rambler case involves not only the construction
of "to transport," but also the meaning and purpose underlying the
entire statutory scheme of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act.
The perspective sketched at the beginning of this article suggests
that particular questions must be analyzed in the context of all
the law. It should be reiterated that:
[A]ll legal questions are fundamentally like those of the penumbra.
It is to assert that there is no central element of actual law to be
seen in the core of central meaning which rules have, that there
is nothing in the nature of a legal rule inconsistent with all ques-
tions being open to reconsideration in the light of social policy.66
Such an analysis would conclude that most of the controlled sub-
stance act is not just bad law, but not law; it would be invalid,
or as phrased in our legal system, unconstitutional.6 7 At the least,
64. 191 Neb. at 468-69, 215 N.W.2d at 853.
65. Id. at 469, 215 N.W.2d at 853.
66. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARv. L.
Rav. 593, 615 (1958). The proposition quoted is what Hart was at-
tempting to deny.
67. "Recognition of the fallacy or irrelevance of positivist theories
of the validity of law carries us some distance towards the dis-
covery of a sound theory, but something more than reference
to experience and the ordinary use of moral language is
needed even if there is no escape from appeal to that court.
The first step in elucidation of the 'validity' of law follows
recognition of the fact that the meaning of that term and the
appropriate tests depend on the adopted theory of law. For
example, in a positivist theory it is irrelevant to ask if a com-
mand, order, directive or commendation is valid in the sense
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it is obvious that section 28-4,135 of the Nebraska statutes6 involves
the seizure and forfeiture of all controlled substances, all raw mate-
rials or equipment used to process controlled substances, all con-
tainers for controlled substances, and all conveyances used to trans-
port the controlled substances or raw materials. The more coherent
construction of section 28-4,135, in light of the purpose of the entire
controlled substance act, is that the conveyances subject to seizure
and forfeiture are those which have been designed to conceal illicit
drugs. For example, conveyances with false panels, hollow bump-
ers, etc. would be within the scope of the statute.
Such a construction coheres with the statutory definition of
"common nuisance," with the general premise that property not
contraband itself is to be returned after seizure, and with the avoid-
ance of serious constitutional questions. Certainly it coheres better
with the underlying purpose of the statute, recognized by Judge
Clinton, to control drug trafficking. The statute may then avoid
problems of punishment by aiming at an activity rather than a per-
son. As stated by Judge Clinton, "the practical effect of [a] pro-
ceeding is the forfeiture by the defendant of a car worth several
thousand dollars and that is an additional penalty which I do not
believe the Legislature contemplated in this situation." 0
The court's decision leaves local prosecutors and police in a sit-
uation where they can use the threat of forfeiture to trample the
human and constitutional rights of citizens.70 An apprehended sus-
of being true or false. One may ask if it is true that a judge
entered this or that order, but it seems foolish to talk about
the truth of the command-if that means talking about it in
the way one talks about the truth of Boyle's law. But in none
of the natural law or sociological theories is positive law
viewed as comprised only of commands. The "reality" of the
classical theory may be interpreted simply as a symbol of the
facts and reasons adduced in support of a moral principle orjudgment and, also, to mean that sound valuations have a dis-
tinctive quality or feature that is suited to relevant situations.
... [A] more inclusive theory of law was suggested, in which
its qualitative and factual, as well as its structural dimensions
were indicated .... [T]he present thesis is that the "valid-
ity" of law must not only include, it also must extend beyond,
logical validity. Of course, the validity of law in this en-
larged view is not demonstrable in the rigorous way in which
the fallacy of the purely empirical proposition is established,
but there are parallels, perhaps strict analogies, between the
modes of proof and the related meanings of truth and validity.
HALL, supra note 13, at 72-73.
68. See Note 55 supra.
69. 191 Neb. at 470, 215 N.W.2d at 853 (Clinton, J., dissenting). If this
is indeed an additional criminal penalty there are most serious consti-
tutional questions involved.
70. See generally Annot., 50 A.L.R.3d 172 (1973).
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pect may be convinced to not assert any number of rights in a des-
perate attempt to avoid forfeiture. Force and fraud have been al-
lowed as virtue.
F. Prosecutorial Misconduct
In State v. Brooks,71 the defendant appealed from a conviction
for unlawful possession of heroin. The prosecutor had engaged in
two glaring examples of misconduct at trial. Nevertheless, by dras-
tically uprooting decisions previously considered to be at the core
of the legal system the court affirmed the conviction.72
Twenty-five years before Griffin v. California,3 the Nebraska
Supreme Court in Bruntz v. State74 reversed a conviction because
of the prosecutor's comment on the defendant's refusal to testify.
In Bruntz that comment was the sole ground for reversal. Section
29-2011 of the Nebraska statutes prohibits prosecutorial comment
upon the accused's failure to testify and has been in effect since
1913. Yet the Brooks court found that the prosecutor's statement
regarding defendant's refusal to take the witness stand76 was inad-
vertent rather than deliberate, 77 and affirmed the lower court's de-
cision. Judge McCown, dissenting as he had in all of the cases dis-
cussed here, noted that the effect on a defendant's rights does not
depend on whether a statement was intentionally made.
In his closing argument the prosecutor stated that "'he was per-
sonally convinced of the Defendant's guilt.' "s78 Such a statement
71. 189 Neb. 592, 204 N.W.2d 86 (1973).
72. The discussion of Brooks focuses on the issues of prosecution miscon-
duct. Brooks also features a serious search and seizure question.
73. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
74. 137 Neb. 565, 290 N.W. 420 (1940).
75. Witnesses; Competency; Impeachment; Interest; Crime Commission;
Accused as Witness; Failure to Testify; Effect; Comment. No
person shall be disqualified as a witness in any criminal pros-
ecution by reason of his interest in the event of the same, as
a party or otherwise, or by reason of his conviction of any
crime, but such interest or conviction may be shown for the
purpose of affecting his credibility. In the trial of all indict-
ments, complaints and other proceedings against persons
charged with the commission of crimes or offenses, the person
so charged shall, at his own request, but not otherwise, be
deemed a competent witness; nor shall the neglect or refusal
to testify create any presumption against him, nor shall any
reference be made to, nor any comment made upon such ne-
glect or refusal.
Nm. REv. STAT. § 29-2011 (1964).
76. The prosecutor stated that "there is no evidence in the record about
Mr. Brooks saying anything, because he did not take the stand." 189
Neb. at 595, 204 N.W.2d at 88.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 594, 204 N.W.2d at 88.
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is contrary to Disciplinary Rule 7-106(C) (4) of the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility 79 adopted by the Nebraska Supreme Court
April 10, 1970. In Wamsley v. State,8 0 the court had held such com-
ments to be improper and generally prejudicial unless the belief
is expressed as a deduction from the evidence. The record in
Brooks did not show the assertion to be such a deduction.8 ' Never-
theless, the court found that the failure to grant a mistrial was
not erroneous.
Finding clear evidence of guilt, the court held that "[u] nder the
circumstances in this case we determine that the denial of a mistrial
was within the discretion of the trial court."8 2  Thus, the recal-
79. DR. 7-106 Trial Conduct.
(A) A lawyer shall not disregard or advise his client to dis-
regard a standing rule of a tribunal or a ruling of a tribu-
nal made in the course of a proceeding, but he may take
appropriate steps in good faith to test the validity of such
rule or ruling.
(B) In presenting a matter to a tribunal, a lawyer shall dis-
close:(1) Legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known
to him to be directly adverse to the position of his
client and which is not disclosed by opposing coun-
sel.(2) Unless privileged or irrelevant, the identities of the
clients he represents and of the persons who em-
ployed him.(C), In appearing in his professional capacity before a tribu-
nal, a lawyer shall not:(1) State or allude to any matter that he has no reason-
able basis to believe is relevant to the case or that
will not be supported by admissible evidence.(2) Ask any question that he has no reasonable basis to
believe is relevant to the case and that is intended
to degrade a witness or other person.(3) Assert his personal knowledge of the facts in issue,
except when testifying as a witness.
(4) Assert his personal opinion as to the justness of a
cause, as to the credibility of a witness, as to the cul-
pability of a civil litigant, or as to the guilt or inno-
cence of an accused; but he may argue, on his analy-
sia of the evidence, for any position or conclusion
with respect to the matters stated herein.(5) Fail to comply with known local customs of courtesy
or practice of the bar or a particular tribunal without
giving to opposing counsel timely notice of his intent
not to comply.
(6) Engage in undignified or discourteous conduct which
is degrading to a tribunal.(7) Intentionally or habitually violate any established
rule of procedure or of evidence.
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1974).
80. 171 Neb. 197, 106 N.W.2d 22 (1960). See generally Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d
766 (1956).
81. 189 Neb. at 598, 204 N.W.2d at 89-90 (McCown, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 595, 204 N.W.2d at 88.
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citrant dope experience entering at the periphery of the legal sys-
tem again resulted in gross distortion of principles at the system's
core. Judge McCown's dissent illuminated the problem. "In the
words of this court in Bruntz v. State, 'If we treat violation indul-
gently, we shall soon-in the words of Pope---'first endure, then
pity, then embrace.' '"83
G. Drugs and the Legal Order
The cases discussed above have accepted legal propositions in
the context of the recalcitrant dope experience that, in order to
cohere, have occasioned drastic and ugly readjustments in the core
concepts of law. Life in America has been remodeled by the new
law which supports the informer, the narcotics agent, and the secret
police. Judicial decisions now sustain an unlimited sovereign, coun-
tenance judicial failure to follow legislative directives designed to
protect an accused, endorse prison terms for possessing without a
prescription a drug used by thousands, construe a statute to impose
a forfeiture of an automobile where a misdemeanor is the only re-
lated criminal offense, and embrace glaring prosecutorial miscon-
duct where guilt of the accused is otherwise thought to be clear.
The illicit drug experience at the periphery of the holistic field of
beliefs regarding law has produced a dysfunction in which reason
has been displaced by a war psychosis as the primary mode of
knowing. Law in particular, and society in the larger sense, has
become the victim.
The "drug problem" is in many ways similar to the "Jewish
problem." It has the potential, and has in fact begun, to destroy
law as it has been known. The inherent dynamics of knowing are
effecting a remodeled system of law and society that becomes in-
creasingly similar to the legal system of a police state such as Nazi
Germany.8 4 The citizens of Germany quietly acquiesced in their
leaders' scheme to gain absolute and irrational power by pointing
to the Jew as the cause of all problems. The legal profession acqui-
83. Id. at 598, 204 N.W.2d at 90 (McCown, J., dissenting).
84. See generally United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Gustaf-
son v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973); State v. Holmberg, Docket No. 39680
(unpublished opinion, Supreme Court of Nebraska, July 24, 1974).
The writer, by use of the term "police state", does not mean to imply
any inherent fascism in law enforcement officials. The police should
be the citizens' friend and supporter. And the citizen should be the
friend and supporter of the police. Unfortunately, the current legal
structure, particularly the legislative directives establishing ever in-
creasing criminality makes this extremely difficult in too many
situations.
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esced.85 Those who spoke out were silenced. You pay your money
and you take your choice.
IV. HOW DID IT HAPPEN HERE?
Most of our institutional officers (whether judges, legislators,
or executives) and most of our citizens are not pernicious persons.
They are warm, alive, and human beings who espouse and act in
other contexts upon the beliefs threatened by the drug laws. It
seems reasonable to ask why, then, the current situation exists. I
suggest that in most instances the cause is not maleficence, but
rather lies in the perception of 'What I have called the recalcitrant
dope experience.8"
Motivation plays a large role in what one perceives.8 7 Need,
drive, tension-the emotional elements-bring percepts out of the
blur of reality into an integrated focus. The child's differentiation
between friendly and hostile voices is a prime example of tension
or need controlling the perceptual processes. The structure we
think we see in the world is a result of practical necessity, and
the selective awareness of the adult is primarily a matter of needs
for peace, stability, and satisfaction. In this way the perceived
85. See generally Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Pro-
fessor Hart, 71 HAnv. L. REv. 630, 644-48 (1958); Hart, Positivism and
the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARv. L. REv. 593, 615-21 (1958).
86. Like Alice on the other side of the looking glass, our two year
examination of drug use, misuse and "abuse" has given us a
constantly reinforced perception that all is not as it seems and
that beliefs and realities are not always equal. All too often,
familiar guidepostj and landmarks, which we assumed could
give us direction and purpose, faded, changed shape or simply
disappeared when carefully scrutinized. All too often, plans
and policies conceived in good will and high hopes had unan-
ticipated negative aspects which created as many problems as
they did solutions.
DRuG CoraInssroN II at 1.
See C. REASONS, THE CRIvINOLOGIST, CRmM, AND THE CRmnNAL (forth-
coming from Goodyear Publishing Company, Pacific Palisades, 1974);
Reasons, Dope, Fiends, and Myths (paper presented at the American
Sociological Association's Annual Meeting, August, 1972, New Or-
leans). The Reasons paper surveyed: (1) Reader's Guide to Periodi-
cal Literature 1890-1970, (2) International Index 1907-1970, and (3)
The Federal Narcotic's Bureau's Annual Report 1930-1967. Reader's
Guide presented dope myths 43 per cent of the time, International In-
dex 52 per cent of the time, and the Bureau 98 per cent of the time.
87. The discussion of motivation, perception, and autism relies on G. MuR-
PHv, PERsONALTy (1947). Again I am indebted to Professors Bishin
and Stone for the introduction. See Bismnn & SToNE, supra note 14,
at 811-17. The discussion here is not complete, but suggests only what
seem to be essential points.
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world mirrors to a great extent the organization of the internal
pattern of needs.
Precepts once integrated crystallize and resist change; new evi-
dence, new phenomena are often unassimilable. Consequently er-
ror becomes standardized, and new percepts must frequently be
sought by the novice or crackpot.8 8 Of course, the outer world can
never be so completely unstructured that perception becomes solely
a function of the perceiver. On the other hand, it is never so struc-
tured of its own nature that the perceiver's role is obliterated.
There is, then, a constant dialectic between emphasis on outer
factors and emphasis on internal factors, so that there is a dynamic
variation in the degree to which emotional elements influence the
organization and cognition.
The major part of institutional and societal cognition of the
"drug problem," again like the "Jewish problem," is an autism. The
cognitive processes have been pushed in the direction of need satis-
faction. A true autism occurs when the emotional elements mark-
edly distort the cognitive picture of reality and the observer is sig-
nificantly misled by the distortion. Unfortunately, the observer is
rarely aware of what is happening.
Autisms are culturally shared. One's community status is
largely dependent on his shared perceptions .with other people of
the community. Moreover, autism occurs not only in perception,
but in all cognitive processes. If there is a central motivating af-
fective ingredient, it is security, the need to be safe in the midst
of the silent majority.
What needs, drives, or tensions have occasioned the autistic re-
sponses of our institutional officers? What affective elements would
be so strong that then cause the drastic warping and uprooting of
core legal principles? The question is not particularly difficult; the
answer is particularly sad, tragic, and consequently seldom given.
Law by its nature restricts freedom. Law is responsibility,
"freedom from," a notion that responds to fear. Hobbes viewed
law as a condition of peace, a pact to prevent and defend against
a state of war. But the state of war is the state of freedom, and
the conception of war of every person against every person is prem-
ised on fear.
It is to the credit of law, and reason as a mode of knowing,
that our fundamental law attempts to check fear responses to free-
dom. All of our great constitutional guarantees have been tested
88. Id. See also T. KuHN, THE SmucTU R OF SciEN.mtc REVOLUTiONS(1964).
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in climates of fear that the freedom they defend must be sacrificed
in order to secure "freedom from" some new and omnipotent dan-
ger. It would be nice to conclude that the fundamental law has
consistently withstood those challenges. The nature of law as a
restriction on freedom, however, tends toward increasing dents in
the paradox of fundamental law. The paradox can be lived with,
but to do so it is essential that the nature of the paradox be under-
stood and that every opportunity be exercised to minimize the
irony. It is in this respect that the American legal system has been
successful even in the midst of defeat.
It should perhaps be noted that many of the great cases (such
as GriswoZd v. Connecticut) 9 exhibit difficulty in showing the
world any single linear discourse that can achieve a status as a
categorical imperative.9 0 To the writer, however, they seem hol-
istically and coherently true. Moreover, principled rationality
played a major role in the knowing that reached the result.
This article has argued that fear has effected a "war psychosis"
which is causing an ugly distortion in the principled rationality that
has traditionally been the prime mode of knowing in the legal sys-
tem. The fundamental law has not successfully withstood the chal-
lenge of this new danger which seems to pose a peculiar threat
to reason itself. It is indeed ironic that it is not dope but fear that
threatens the rationality of the legal system and society that stand
as the guardian of freedom.
The law is the serpent that eats his own tail. Perhaps human-
kind is destined to remain tied to the wheel of desire, ego, and fear.
But humans and human legal systems are holistic, and they share
emotions other than fear. Clarence Darrow struggled against autis-
tic response, whether occasioned by fear, hate, or ignorance,
throughout his professional career. In his closing argument in the
defense of Nathan Leopold and Richard Loeb, Darrow represented
much of the linear discourse of reason that today has become the
legal rationale which denies institutionalized death a role in the
sovereign's criminal law. And, although as a lawyer he relied on
reason as a prime mode of knowing, he realized that reason is not,
and cannot be, isolated or insulated from life. His closing words
to the court in that case are instructive.
I wal reading last night of the aspiration of the old Persian poet,
Omar Khayyam. It appealed to me as the highest that I can vision.
I wish it was in my heart, and I wish it was in the hearts of all.
89. 381 .S. 479 (1965).
90. See A. WcHsL m, Pmcnms, Pocs, Am FumwAlWmTAL LAw
(1961); A. BIc=, THE LEAsT DANGERous BRsxcH (1962).
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"So I be written in the Book of Love,
I do not care about that Book above,
Erase my name or write it as you will
So I be written in the Book of Love."91
This article has suggested that a reorganization of thoughts is
in order as an approach to the recalcitrant dope experience and
its victimization of core concepts of American law. It is the func-
tion of those concepts to support a reasoned defense of freedom
in the face of fear. These are the concepts which attempt to ensure
the uncertainty and beauty of life against the bleak and cheerless
stability of a totalitarian existence. Of course, to know liberty is
also to have known love. I can offer nothing better than a rephras-
ing of Darrow's insight. Search for those propositions which are
at the core of our total field. Hypothesize them and test them.
Listen to our children laugh, hug each other, and accept no asser-
tion not cohering with love.
91. FAMOUS AzuracAN JuRY SPEcHE (C.E. Hicks ed. 1925).
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APPENDIX
This appendix attempts to present an annotated bibliography
of articles in legal or law related periodicals which have considered
the "drug problem." Approximately the last ten years of writings
have been reviewed. The selection and summaries were not in-
tended to substantiate the views offered in the body of the paper,
nor is it intended as an authoritative index. It is hoped that a re-
view of the appendix will, however, support the thesis urged in
the text that our drug laws are a national, state, and local disgrace;
that they tend toward the destruction, of notions of law, justice,
and virtue; and that they must be changed at once to help pull
America out of a "war psychosis."
Law is, of course, maleable. The hammer of the drug laws has
shaped a medieval gargoyle. Conservationists are attempting to
aid the "real" American Eagle, but that bird must not perish in
any reality.
The author wishes to thank and gratefully acknowledge Ms.
Gina Dunning and Ms. Harlene Holz for their assistance preparing
this bibliography.
1.. Aronowitz, Civil Commitment of Narcotic Addicts, 67 COLUTm. L. REv.
405 (1967).
CONCLUSION: Involuntary commitment is not justified on the basis
of current knowledge.
LEGAL ARGUMENTS: (1) Deprivation of liberty without having
been convicted of a crime and (2) difficulty of obtaining appropriate
evidence.
2. Atkins, Legal aspects of vocational rehabilitation of drug addicts, 2
CoNTErav. DRUG PosBi.mvms 607 (1973).
OVERVIEW: Discussion of various legal protections and non-pretec-
tions of people involved in drug treatment programs.
POSITION: Every consideration should be made to ensure the pri-
vacy of those in drug treatment programs. Counter productive legal
impediment (for example, revoking drivers licenses of those convicted
of drug use thereby severely limiting employment possibilities) should
be removed.
3. Bartles, Better Living Through Legislation: The Control of Mind
Altering Drugs, 21 U. KAw. L. REv. 439 (1973).
POSITION: Use of heavy criminal sanctions to eliminate drug abuse
is costly and unwise. To minimize the problem it must be recognized
that because something is called a drug does not mean that it must
be destroyed before it destroys society.
4. Baumgartner, The Effect of Drugs on Criminal Responsibility, Specific
Intent, and Mental Competency, 8 Am. Cim. L.Q. 118 (1970).
CONCLUSION: Drugs or addiction alone is generally insufficient to
establish a defense of insanity. If proved, however, they may be suffi-
cient to preclude intent or reduce the charge. Alcohol or drug induced
incapacity is frequently accepted in instances of "involuntary" confes-
sions and waiving constitutional rights, but these situations are sub-ject to "special judicial scrutiny."
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5. Bennett, Drug Addiction and Its Effect on Criminal Responsibility, 9
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 179 (1973).
VIEW: A person under the influence of narcotics, voluntarily taken,
should not be held responsible for criminal acts if a specific criminal
intent is required as an element of that crime and the intoxicated con-
dition prohibits the formation of intent.
6. Bevans, International Conventions in the Field of Narcotic Drugs, 37
TEMP. L.Q. 41 (1963).
THEME: A summary of international conventions and resulting
agreements concerning the control of narcotics manufacture, sale (im-
port-export) and use of drugs.
7. Bonnie & Whitebread, The Forbidden Fruit and the Tree of Knowl-
edge: An Inquiry into the Legal History of American Marijuana Pro-
hibition, 56 VA. L. REv. 971 (1970).
SUMMARY: This is an extensive history of marijuana statutes and
a discussion of cases arising thereunder. It is argued that most of the
laws were passed without knowing the truth about the effects of
marijuana.
LEGAL ARGUMENTS: (1) Due process and equal protection, id. at
1128; (2) cruel and unusual punishment, id. at 1133; (3) "status" ar-
gument based on Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) and Pow-
ell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968), id. at 1141; (4) free exercise of reli-
gion, id. at 1142; (5) right of privacy, id. at 1145; (6) ninth amend-
ment, id. at 1147; and (7) inappropriate use of police power, id. at
1149.
8. Bowman, Narcotic Addiction and Criminal Responsibility Under Dur-
ham, 53 GEO. L.J. 1017 (1965).
THESIS: Drug addiction is an illness or disease; use does not prove
addiction.
LEGAL ARGUMENT: The jury should be given the insanity instruc-
tion when determining criminal responsibility while under the influ-
ence of narcotics.
9. Boyko & Rotberg, Constitutional Objections to California's Marijuana
Possession Statute, 14 U.C.L.A.L. Rlv. 773 (1967).
VIEW: The author criticizes the California statute requiring a manda-
tory minimum sentence of one year because: (1) marijuana is not
addictive and no worse than alcohol or tobacco; (2) use leads neither
to use of hard drugs or other crimes; and (3) the statute probably
does not meet equal protection standards, see 787-88, substantive due
process, see 790-91, and invades one's right to privacy, see 792.
10. Brown, Narcotics and Nalline: Six Years of Testing, 27 FED. PROBA-
TnoN, June, 1963, at 27.
PREMISE: Nalline is a drug administered to a drug offender suspect
for quick confirmation of status.
CAVEAT: The test must be carefully administered to minimize pain
and, discomfort if it is to be acceptable to courts and meet modern
law enforcement standards.
11. Bruen, Three Faces of Danger from Drugs, 42 N.Y.S.B.J. 612 (1970).
THESIS: The drug problem is a result of lowered moral standards
of society and pseudo-sophisticated pseudo-scientific ideas of the older
generation that reject the values of the Judaeo-Christian religion. He
believes "No treatment can be effective to cure an individual's drug
problem which does not face the problem which causes the individual
to rely on drugs." Id. at 620.
12. Burnett, Crisis in Narcotics-Are Existing Federal Penalties Effective,
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10 WM. & MARY L. REV. 636 (1969).
THESIS: Despite a call for stricter penalties for drug abuse it is
"sheer fancy" to believe they act as a deterrent.
LEGAL ARGUMENTS: (1) Overbroad drug laws; (2) insanity as a
defense of the victim; and (3) eighth amendment questions of cruel
and unusual punishment.
13. Cahill, A Joint Move Against Narcotics, 7 TRiAL, May-June, 1971, at
15.
SUMMARY: Drug abuse is a serious problem with no simple answer.
The New Jersey plan includes a uniform law that treats all drugs
alike, aims heavily at pushers, provides for an enlarged rehabilitation
program (including expanded methadone treatment), and an ex-
tensive education program for the schools.
14. Cahn, Control Can't Wait for Social Changes, 4 TRIAL, April-May, 1968,
at 41.
THESIS: 'When we speak of the dangers of drug abuse and drug ad-
diction, ours is a discourse of desperate urgency, for the stakes in our
struggle against the social cancer are not only wasted lives and human
suffering but, indeed, the foundations of social order and very survival
of political democracy itself ... Our growing drug culture repre-
sents not only a mortal threat to political democracy, it is also the
irreconcilable force of freedom in personal life, the implacable enemy
of moral self-determination."
15. Cancellaro & Harriman, Narcotic Addiction and Legal Responsibility:
A Dilemma, 19 WAYwE L. REv. 1041 (1973).
THESIS: There is much confusion between legality and justice with
respect to drug use. The law regarding narcotics has a flip-flop ten-
dency seemingly without consistency or rationale.
VIEW: A balance is needed between limitations on individual rights
and making the best treatment available to drug users.
16. Card, Aspects of British Drugs Legislation, 20 U. TORONTO L.J. 88
(1970).
SUMMARY: The British Dangerous Drugs Acts are aimed at preven-
tion and control, not punishment. Addiction is considered illness, not
a crime, and doctors may prescribe drugs for addicts. Unauthorized
possession is an offense, however, with a maximum penalty of £ 1,000
and/or imprisonment for 10 years on conviction or indictment,
£ 250 and/or imprisonment for 12 months on summary conviction.
It has been recommended that the punishment be substantially
reduced.
17. Cazalas, Addiction in the United States: A Medical-Legal History,
18 LoYoLA L. REv. 1 (1972).
CONCLUSION: Since 1914 when United States first began to regulate
narcotic drugs the treatment goal of total abstinence has been an over-
whelming failure. Methadone maintenance has proved more success-
ful than previous approaches.
SUGGESTIONS: (1) drug education, (2) law enforcement and cus-
toms, (3) medical treatment and (4) rehabilitation research.
18. Cazalas & Bucaro, Methadone Maintenance Blockade Treatment: A
Solution for Addiction, 16 LOYOLA L. REV. 1 (1970).
THESIS: Drug addicts are "ill human beings" who should be reinte-
grated into society.
SUGGESTIONS: Addicts should be allowed a choice of methadone
maintenance or "cold turkey" drying out. The public should be edu-
cated so they do not rely on the "crutch" of drugs.
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19. Celler, An Alternative Proposal for Dealing with Drug Addiction, 27
FED. PROBATION, June, 1963, at 24.
PREMISE: The White House Conference proposal for a federal pro-
gram of civil commitment is too restrictive because those who need
it would be ineligible.
SUGGESTION: Money should be given to the states for hospitalizing
and rehabilitating addicts.
20. Chapel & Taylor, Drugs for Kicks, 16 CRnvImE & DELNQUENcY 1 (1970).
CONCLUSION: Legal restrictions for glue sniffing and related
"highs" would probably only force it underground.
21. Clark, Drugs and the Law, 18 LOYOLA L. Rzv. 243 (1972).
CONCLUSION: The basis for current marijuana laws has been
proven to be false and thus legislatures should repeal the laws. Li-
cense laws should be substituted. "Indeed, in an appropriate case, the
Supreme Court might find it difficult to uphold a prosecution for pos-
session under the present law." Id. at 247.
22. Cohen, Control of Drug Abuse, 34 FED. PROBATiON, March, 1970, at 32.
SUMMARY: An overview of the illicit use of stimulants, sedatives,
hallucinogenic and allied drugs.
RECOMMENDATIONS: (1) abolish mandatory sentence; (2) make
possession and use of marijuana and hallucinogenics misdemeanors;(3) make a decision reflecting the medical aspect of the problem; (4)
conduct intensified marijuana research; (5) support federal education
and research development; and (6) establish treatment facilities.
23. Cohrssen & Lieberman, Cannabis: A Forensic-Medical Review, 24
Sw. L.J. 446 (1970).
POSITION: Given the medical "truth" about marijuana and the
"fact" that present repressive marijuana laws do not work, the sugges-
tion that the laws, and especially the mandatory minimal sentence,
be revised or repealed should be given serious consideration.
24. Corso, Legislative Solution to Narcotic and Drug Addiction, 12 CATH-
oLuc LAw. 125 (1966).
POSITION: The drug problem in New York has caused a dramatic
increase in crime. The New York Legislature's plan for combatting
it is close control of legal distribution and commitment of addicts to
effect a cure.
25. Cuskey & Krasner, The eyes of the beholder: the drug addict as
criminal, patient or victim, 2 CoNrmxp. DRUG PRoBLE1ws 579 (1973).
PREMISE: The primary difference between licit drugs of abuse and
illicit drugs lies in how they are defined, perceived, and reacted to
by legislatures and has little to do with chemistry, psychology or po-
tential for danger.
THEME: Classification of the drug user as a criminal, patient or vic-
tim determines what kind of help they will or should receive.
26. Decker, The Official Report of the National Commission Studying
Marihuana: More Misunderstanding, 8 U. SAx FANucisco L. REv. 1
(1973).
OVERVIEW: The policy of criminalizing marijuana has created seri-
ous philosophical, legal, criminal and law enforcement problems that
society has been incapable of solving. The partial prohibition of the
Presidential Commission reveals no workable solution.
27. Di Suvero, Drug Offenses and the New Penal Law, 32 BRoouxLq L.
REv. 287 (1966).
LEGAL THEORIES: (1) In view of Robinson's holding that addiction
is an illness, punishment for use and possession also violate the eighth
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and fourteenth amendments' prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment because the status necessarily requires the other two; (2)
the quasi-criminal approach of commitment for rehabilitation may be
contrary to due process requirements; (3) it is questionable whether
detention of non-criminal addicts is justifiable under the police power.
28. DuPont, How Corrections Can Beat the High Cost of Heroin Addiction,
35 FED. PROBATION, June, 1971, at 43.
THESIS: Treatment in corrections setting, especially the methadone
treatment, can be and is successful in reducing crime.
29. El-Kayal, A Comparative Study of Narcotics and the Law in the
United Arab Republic and the United States, 20 DE PAur L. RPv. 859
(1971).
SUGGESTION: Law enforcement should focus on traffickers and not
on use and possession. Addiction should be treated as an illness with
civil commitment where necessary to encourage rehabilitation. The
best attack is education of the non-user and improvement of conditions
that cause turning to drugs.
30. Fahey, The Enforcement of the Illinois Felony Marijuana Law in Geor-
gia, 1971 WAsi:. U.L.Q. 281.
OVERVIEW: The results of a survey and study of police and court
activity on marijuana law enforcement are included. Attention was
directed toward the role of race in selective enforcement. The article
takes notice of police dilemma regarding personal constitutional rights
versus duty to maintain law and order.
31. Ford, LSD and the Law: A Framework for Policy Making, 54 lum.
L. REv. 775 (1970).
POSITION: The present laws concerning LSD are unnecessary, ignor-
ant, and ineffective reactions to unfounded fears. Medical and scien-
tific research is offered as "proof."
PROPOSAL: A state or federal controlled use to individuals and re-
searchers until "a general improvement of the quality of American so-
ciety. . . came to pass (when) either the need which LSD fills would
disappear or its usage would become simply one very minor aspect
of social life." Id. at 804.
32. Frankel, Narcotic Addiction, Criminal Responsibility and Civil Com-
mitment, 1966 UTAH L. REV. 581.
THESIS: Drug addiction is primarily a medical-social problem found
among those with personality weakness and social, economic, cultural
and familial deprivation causing frustrations. It is also found among
those with access to supply (doctors and nurses).
LEGAL ARGUMENTS: (1) Criminal punishment is ineffective; and
(2) due process question.
33. Greenstein & DiBianco, Marijuana Laws-A Crime Against Humanity,
48 NoTRE DAavm LAW. 314 (1972).
POSITION: Marijuana laws are currently destroying more lives than
the drug itself might do 40 years in the future. It should be legalized
and controlled as is alcohol because "once a large number of people
have decided that they will persist in the use'of an intoxicant, govern-
ment should not continue to criminalize the users of that drug." Id.
at 332.
LEGAL ARGUMENT: It is probably unconstitutional to prohibit pri-
vate use. Id. at 326. Penalties are illogical, id. at 320-22, especially
since they are based on currently disproven "facts" and fears.
34. Grinspoon & Hedblom, Marijuana and amphetamines: A Mirror Im-
age, 2 CONTEMP. DRuG PROBLEMS 665 (1973).
386 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 54, NO. 2 (1975)
POSITION: Amphetamines have a high potential for psychological,
physical, and social harm and should be tightly controlled.
35. Grupp & Lucas, The "Marihuana Muddle" as Reflected in California
Arrest Statistics and Dispositions, 5 LAw & Soc'y Rsv. 251 (1970).
OVERVIEW: Statistics presented show the arrests each year for mari-juana are increasing, but while the disparity between arrests and con-
victions continues to widen, severity of punishment is declining.
CONCLUSION: "Continued effort to attempt to enforce and to expect
enforcement of a law which attempts to regulate behavior that increas-
ing numbers of persons participate in or tolerate, a law whose wisdom
is questioned by persons representing a broad spectrum of lay and pro-
fessional segments of our society and which appears to be largely un-
enforceable, can only lead to further disrespect for and attenuation of
the law enforcement process." Id. at 266.
36. Haig, Drugs: Some New Prospectives, 1 CAN. B.J., Oct. 1970, at 1.
SUMMARY: Almost everyone in modern society is a drug user-as-
pirin, cough medicine, pep pills, etc. Those who use drugs for non-
medical reasons do so to: avoid stress; escape; have new experiences;
achieve improved understanding; and achieve a sense of belonging or
to express independence or hostility. This is at great cost to society,
and while some argue marijuana is less harmful than alcohol, society
would be better off without either.
SUGGESTIONS: Understand those who abuse drugs and try to cure
the source of the problem.
37. Heller, A Conflict of Laws: The Drug Possession Offense and the
Fourth Amendment, 26 OKLA. L. Ruv. 317 (1973).
THEME: Society must choose either to stop enforcing the possession
offense or give up constitutional protections on privacy.
PREMISE: Search and seizure rules affect police paperwork more
than they influence police practices.
38. Hoff, Drug Abuse, 51 Mn.. L. REV. 147 (1971).
THESIS: Though there may be some need to prohibit "hard" drugs
and hallucenogens (mostly medical considerations) marijuana laws
should be loosened or repealed and regulated as alcohol.
LEGAL ARGUMENT: Prohibiting marijuana use should require a
compelling state interest. Equal protection guarantees of Skinner v.
Oklahoma and zones of privacy as defined in Griswold v. Connecticut
raise serious questions. The military even thinks marijuana is not
criminal.
39. Homes, Drug Addiction: Law and Attitudes, 18 LoyoLA L. Rav. 39
(1971).
THESIS: Drug legislation reflects society's desire to reinforce their
moral position rooted in the Puritan ethic. Addicts are classified as
evil and therefore conflict with the good society seeks to establish and
maintain. They are isolated as a class, first in thought and then phys-
ically as individuals by civil or criminal commitment to protect soci-
ety.
40. Huberty, Civil Comitment of the Narcotic Addict: Evolution of a
Treatment Method, 18 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 99 (1972).
SUMMVIARY: Civil commitment has a much higher success rate than
does criminal commitment. So far it has survived Robinson's "cruel
and unusual punishment" tests. The New York Court of Appeals,
however, upheld an addict's constitutional rights to remain silent, have
an attorney present, and other safeguards. Matter of James, 54 Misc.
2d 514, 283 N.Y.2d 126 (Sup. Ct. 1968). Some argue that there is a
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right not to be treated while others say if there is such a right, social
costs of addiction might outweigh the right, especially if there is a high
life risk. Id. at 107-08.
41. Hughes, United States Narcotics Laws, 1964 CRin. L.R. 520.
VIEW: The drug problem in the United States is self-made because
drug use has been made a crime. There is no justification for believ-
ing marijuana leads to the use of heroin and other drugs. Further,
it is doubtful that drugs lead to criminal activities, but even if true,
penalties based on puritanical views are too strict.
SUGGESTION: Give drugs away as in Britain.
42. Hurley, Anti-Narcotic Testing: A Physician's Point of View, 27 FErD.
PROBATION, June, 1963, at 32.
PREMISE: Anti-narcotic testing is useful in controlling and detecting
post addiction use problems.
43. Irwin, A rational approach to drug abuse prevention, 2 Co=Lrzi. DRUG
PROBLEMS 3 (1973).
SUGGESTION: There seems no clear instance in which punishment
for the infraction of the law is more harmful than the crime or the
laws more detrimental to the needs of society than the present drug
abuse control laws.
44. Jacobson, Alcoholism and Drug Abuse, 7 TRIAL, May-June, 1971, at 13.
SUGGESTION: Legalization of marijuana, regulation and education
are the best ways to deal with the problems resulting from the large
number of students and Vietnam veterans who have used and do use
marijuana.
45. Kinsley, Legal Control if Narcotics, 23 FooD DRUG CosM. L.J. 306
(1968).
THESIS: Current devices used to control origin, possession, sale and
to restrict the market are ineffective.
SUGGESTION: "We need thought, study and action to provide on the
same compulsory basis for the psychological and psychiatric treatment
of the non-addicts users of narcotics and of dangerous drugs." Id. at
311.
46. Kleeman & Posner, The Comprehensive Drug Rehabilitation and
Treatment Act: Treatment in Lieu of Prosecution, 56 MAss. L.Q. 171
(1971).
OVERVIEW: A section by section analysis of Massachusetts' law pro-
viding for treatment for the addict or habitual user.
47. Kramer, The State Versus the Addict: Uncivil Commitment, 50
B.U.L. REV. 1 (1970).
CONCLUSION: "Dependence on opiates is a sufficient threat to our
slociety as a whole and to the individuals within our society that sub-
stantial efforts to control, and if possible, eliminate it are justified.
However, efforts to control or eliminate illegal opiate use can be car-
ried out in such a manner and to such a degree that the cure is worse
than the disease.... The trouble with the California Civil Addict
program ... is not merely that it violates the spirit if not the letter,
of the Supreme Court decision in Robinson v. California, but also that
it does not work." Id. at 21-22.
48. Kuh, Civil Commitment for Narcotic Addicts, 27 FED. PROBATION, June,
1963, at 21.
PREMISE: Drug use and addiction is a contagious disease.
SUGGESTION: Quarantine user and give firm supervision to former
addict with civil commitment voluntarily or after arrest.
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49. Lang, Narcotics Legislation-A Total Approach, 12 CATHOLIC LAW. 131
(1966).
THEME: The article discusses the legal justification of New York's
drug legislation dealing with the "pernicious criminal and social prob-
lem."
VIEW: Civil commitment is justified under the police power.
50. Lang, The President's Crime Commission Task Force Report On Nar-
cotics and Drug Abuse: A Critique of the Apologia, 43 NomE DAME
LAw 847 (1968).
THESIS: Society has the right, and perhaps the duty, under the police
power to protect itself from effects of drug abuse. This includes incar-
ceration for possession and sale, as well as civil commitment for the
addict.
SUGGESTION: An improvement could be made by properly classify-
ing 'hard and soft" drugs and adjusting penalties. The argument that
marijuana is not as bad as alcohol is not acceptable because alcohol
is admittedly "bad" and society need not tolerate an additional wrong
merely because one is accepted.
51. Laughlin, LSD-25 and Other Hallucinogens: A Pre-Reform Proposal,
36 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 23 (1967).
THESIS: Hallucinogens are a means of escaping society's restrictions
and realities, but are bad only because they are illegal. Legalization
would put many criminals (users, pushers, and organized crime) out
of business.
LEGAL OBJECTION: Freedom of religion and possible conflict with
United States v. Seegar definition of "religious belief" as "fundamental
personal right."
52. Levine, Narcotic Addiction as Viewed by a Federal Narcotic Agent,
28 FED. PROBATION, Dec., 1964, at 30.
THEME: Traffickers should be jailed and users confined for treat-
ment. The author's primary concern is for the safety and welfare of
nonaddict contemporaries of addicts.
53. Lynch, The Pharmacology of Addicting Drugs, 12 CATHoLIc LAw. 121(1966).
THESIS: Narcotic addiction is a health problem (as distinguished
from a medical problem because it is bad for the individual) and
should be erradicated by law to prevent further increase.
54. Lynch, The California Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Law, 12 N.Y.L.F.
369 (1966).
TOPIC: The California statute allows involuntary commitment of
those persons addicted, or those who by reason of repeated narcotics
use are in immediate danger of becoming addicted.
LEGAL BASIS: The statute is constitutional under state police power
and affords procedural due process.
55. McDonald, A Judge Looks at Drug Addiction, 7 Tami. May-June, 1971,
at 16.
CONCLUSION: Drug addiction is "a dangerous disease for which
there is no specific cure presently known to the civilized world. It
is more dangerous than cancer ... it is the new bubonic plague and
spreads on contact". Id. "Quarantine" by way of civil or criminal
commitment is as necessary as for diphtheria or leprosy.
56. McMorris, The Decriminalization of Narcotics Addiction, 3 AM. CRrwL
L.Q. 84 (1965).
THEME: Narcotics users should be cared for as persons with an ill-
ness and not as criminals. Rehabilitation centers, even for those con-
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victed of crimes, are the best answer.
LEGAL BASIS: Cruel and unusual punishment based on Robinson
v. California, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
57. Murray, Psychology and The Drug Addict, 12 CATHOLiC LAw. 98 (1966).
THESIS: Drug addiction is! an illness; not until 1914 was use consid-
ered criminal or immoral.
58. Oliver, A Judge Looks at LSD, 32 FED. PROBATiON, March, 1968, at 5.
VIEW: There may be some question as to the advisability of a law
prohibiting LSD. When enforcing the provisions of the law against
an admitted user the judge fortunately has been given discretion to
act on a case by case basis as the circumstances of the defendant war-
rant.
59. Robertson & Teitelbaum, Optimizing Legal Impact: A Case Study in
Search of a Theory, 1973 Wis. L. REV. 665.
PREMISE: Law makers should adopt a cost-benefit theory to keep
their theories and policies in the real world.
ARGUMENT: Legal effectiveness depends on (1) identification of the
problem and determination of means for solving it; (2) communica-
tion of the law to persons affected, especially implementors; (3) in-
centives to obtain desired results; and (4) official and non-official
mandates for implementation.
60. Rosenbloom, Drug Addiction: A Personal View, 54 Ky. L.J. 268
(1966).
VIEW: Drug addicts (particularly Jewish) exhibit certain common
characteristics indicating a poor social adjustment, poor family back-
ground, no father, overindulgence, and deviant sexual behavior, among
others.
SUGGESTIONS: Alternatives to institutionalization include (1) treat-
ment as medical case (2) Synanon-type half-way houses, and (3) out-
patient clinics.
61. Rosenthal, Two Problems and a Lesson for the Draftsman of Drug
Crimes Legislation, 24 Sw. L.J. 407 (1970).
The first problem is the value and place of the theory of deterrence
as it relates to the sale and use of drugs themselves and the deterring
effect of drug penalties on other crimes. The second problem relates
to the response of the law to distributors and users as groups.
CONCLUSION: Laws have costs as well as benefits. The costs of
having a law, particularly with respect to marijuana use, outweigh the
benefits and would probably do so if only sales were prohibited.
62. Rotenberg & Sayer, Marijuana in the Houston High Schools-A First
Report, 6 HousToN L. REv. 759 (1969).
OVERVIEW: A report on activities of police and school authorities
in efforts to curb marijuana use and their effectiveness (or ineffective-
ness). The report is based on interviews from police, school person-
nel, students and parents.
T1HESIS: Most activities are at least ineffective and in many cases
unconstitutional.
63. Skinner, Drug Abuse: An Opportunity for Drug Lawyers, 26 FooD-
DRuG CosM. L.J. 111 (1971).
POSITION: Lawyers should be active in helping to keep drug law
enforcement and reform in pace with society. In so doing they meet
the problems before they become clients and cases.
64. Smith, Marijuana and Health: Quest for a Public Policy, 7 TaxAL 20
(May/June 1971).
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OVERVIEW: -An unemotional summary of pattern of use and effects
and possible future problems resulting from continued use of mari-juana.
65. Stern, Marihuana and the Law-Will the Real Issues Please Stand Up,
11 CRiMmOLoGY 275 (1973).
VIEW: The issue is not marihuana smoking as a health hazard but
whether millions of people who use marihuana should be made crimi-
nals. Discussion should center on the overreaching of government.
66. Sternberg, Synanon House-A Consideration of Its Implications for
American Correction, 54 J. Cnmv. L.C. & P.S. 447 (1963).
THEME: Half-way houses appear to work for drug addicts but may
be ineffective in dealing with other criminals because drug addiction
is not a crime per se and addicts need a unique kind of rehabilitation.
67. Whitebread & Stevens, Constructive Possession in Narcotics Cases:
To Have and Not Have, 58 VA. L. Ruv. 751 (1972).
POSITION: The various tests the courts have formulated of construc-
tive possession in narcotics cases have failed to provide meaningful
response, clouded judicial decision making with conclusory labels and
created a morass of confusion and inconsistency not found when pos-
session statutes are applied to objects other than drugs.
68. Tauro, Marijuana and Relevant Problems-1969, 7 Am. Camn. L.Q.
174 (1969).
VIEW: As judge in Commonwealth v. Leis, 69 Mass. Adv. Sh. 97(1967). Tauro held marijuana to be harmful and dangerous, use and
possession were not fundamental rights, prohibition was within the po-
lice power and was not a denial of equal protection.
THESIS: On the basis of what is now known and understood mari-juana is dangerous; it has no positive attributes and it need not be
proven addiction leads to criminal activity or hard drugs.
69. Tedrow, Drug Registration Abroad, 37 TEMP. L.Q. 59 (1963).
THEME: A more uniform system of drug registration should be im-
plemented in all countries so medical disasters, such as the thalido-
mide tragedy, could be avoided while keeping dangerous but useful
drugs available.
70. Washington, Adverse Legal Implications of Heroin Maintenance, 4 N.
CAR. CENTRAL L. REv. 255 (1973).
SUGGESTION: Heroin maintenance is not the answer to the drug
problem. A more honest approach would involve the actual decrim-
inalization of all narcotics possession laws.
CONCLUSION: Causes of action, such as tort liability for failure to
act and malpractice, could be brought by addicts against heroin main-
tenance programs.
71. Weiss & Wizner, Pot, Prayer, Politics, and Privacy: The Right to Cut
Your Own Throat in Your Own Way, 54 IowA L. REv. 709 (1969).
THESIS: Drug use falls within the freedom of expression of the first
amendment.
SUMMARY: The article includes an analysis of decisions regarding
freedom of religion and how drug use fits within it. Also, there is
a section on "the right to be self-destructive" as associated with free-
dom of religion and the criminal law. See id. at 730-35.
72. Whitford, The Physician, the Law and the Drug Abuser, 119 U. PA.
L. REv. 933 (1971).
THESIS: For the treatment and rehabilitation approach to work the
addict must be allowed to seek medical aid without fear of discovery,
especially through doctor-patient confidences.
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73. Wildes, The United States Immigration Service v. John Lennon: The
Cultural Lag, 40 BROOKLYN L. REV. 279 (1973).
SUMMARY: The exclusionary provisions keeping John Lennon out
of the country for possession of hashish are at best unreasonable and
possibly unconstitutional.
74. Wood, Preventive Law: The California Rehabilitation Center, 2 SAN
DiEGo L. REv. 54 (1965).
SUIVIMARY: The California addiction control and treatment program
operates on much the same basis as mental commitment. Both crimi-
nal and non-criminal addicts are involved.
75. Young Lawyers' Conference, Drugs: Survey Results and Recommen-
dations, 1 CAN. B.J., Oct. 1970, at 5.
OVERVIEW: A short summary of a survey of 257 Canadian lawyers
indicating marijuana should be separated from the other drugs in reg-
ulation and though it should not be legalized, the severity of punish-
ment should be reviewed.
76. Zinberg, Why now? Drug use as a response to social and technologi-
cal change, 1 CONTEMvP. DRUG PROBLEMS 747 (1972).
THESIS: Drug use is a vehicle of response rather than an end in it-
self. "In 1925 today's cannabis smoker might have gone to a speak-
easy for a drink. In 1905 he might have bought himself a boater. In
1885 he might have gone West." Id. at 781.
77. Note, Rehabilitation of Drug-Dependent Persons, 21 CLuv. ST. L. REV.
180 (No. 3, 1973).
OVERVIEW: There seems to be no doubt that the state has power
to punish or at least do something about drug related problems
through the police power. Criminal commitment has not worked, and
civil commitment is the new approach. There is a split of authority
as to whether Miranda rights are available in civil commitment pro-
cedures.
78. Comment, The Iowa Controlled Substances Act and the Accomodation
Defense, 59 IowA L. REv. 640 (1974).
TOPIC: Constitutional flows in Iowa's accommodations defense in-
'clude placing burden of proof on defendant, deprivation of jury trial
and violation of the right against self incrimination.
79. Note, The Armed Forces' Narcotic and Drug Detection and Rehabilita-
tion Program: An Analysis of Some Legal Issues and Problems, 7
NEW ENG. L. REv. 333 (1972).
OVERVIEW: The Note examines the Military Narcotics and Danger-
ous Drug Program and raises questions of possible fifth amendment
violations.
SUGGESTION: Despite its shortcomings, the Military Program
should not be rejected but improved upon by assuring that the civil
liberties of the individual are respected.
80. Note, Diversion of Drug Offenders in California, 26 STAN. L. REV. 923
(1974).
VIEW: The California diversion statute represents a significant step
towards a more human treatment of drug abusers but several provi-
sions of the statute are either unconstitutional on their face or as
applied.
81. Comment, Marijuana Possessiun and the California Constitutional Pro-
hibition of Cruel or Unusual Punishment, 21 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1136
(1974).
CONCLUSION: A criminal law authorizing incarceration of enormous
numbers of otherwise law abiding citizens for the commission of a
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relatively harmless, nonviolent and victimless act is unusual in any
sense of the word.
82. Marijuana Laws: An Empirical Study of Enforcement and Adminis-
tration in Los Angeles County, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1499 (1968).
SUMDIMARY: This article is a study of arrests and disposition of mari-juana offenders. It suggests the harm caused by marijuana is not
worth the time, energy, and money spent by the police and courts
when there are other pressing problems, but declines to make the
statement openly.
83. Contemporary Problems of Drug Abuse: A National Symposium for
Law and Medical Students, 18 Vn. L. REv. 787 (1973).
OVERVIEW: Various views and solutions were presented by numer-
ous participants.
